The Citizenship Dialectic by Román, Ediberto
Florida International University College of Law 
eCollections 
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 
2006 
The Citizenship Dialectic 
Ediberto Román 
Florida International University College of Law, romane@fiu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Fourteenth Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ediberto Román, The Citizenship Dialectic , 20 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 557 (2006). 
Available at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty_publications/308 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at eCollections. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCollections. For more information, 
please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu. 
? ???? ?????
Citation: 20 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 557 2005-2006 
Provided by: 
FIU College of Law
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Thu Jun 22 08:49:48 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
ARTICLES
THE CITIZENSHIP DIALECTIC
EDIBERTO ROM.N*
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................
II. THE CLASSIC CONSTRUCTION OF CITIZENSHIP .............
A. Citizenship's Equality Component ................
B. The Exclusionary Aspect .......................
C. The Modern Construction ......................
III. SUBORDINATES IN LAW .............................
A. The Indigenous People ........................
B. The Territorial Island Inhabitants ................
IV. SUBORDINATES IN FACT? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. African-Americans ...........................
B. Mexican-Americans ..........................
C. Other Non-Whites ............................
V. THE RACIST NATURE OF NATURALIZATION ...............
VI. THE CONTEMPORARY DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT ............
VII. A NEW CONSTRUCTION ............................
VIII. CONCLUSION ....................................
558
563
564
568
572
579
580
585
589
589
598
601
603
605
606
607
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, Florida International University
College of Law. © 2006, Ediberto Romn. This is a footnoted version of presentations I made at the
2004 Law & Society Conference and the 2005 People of Color Scholarship Conference at George
Washington University. I would like to thank Professors Richard Delgado, Jean Stefancic, Gerald
Torres, Ian Haney Lopez, Michael Olivas, Kevin Johnson, Mary Romero, Joe Thome, Linda Greene,
Thomas Baker, Jorge Esquirol, Carlton Waterhouse, and Hannibal Travis for their comments on this
article. I would also like to thank Reference Librarian Jan Stone for her invaluable investigative
assistance and Ms. Sandra Trujillo for her outstanding research assistance.
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you reside in a country not unlike the United States, with a
similar cultural, economic, racial and ethnic mix. As in many other countries,
the events of September 11, 2001, dramatically changed the lives of the
inhabitants of your land. Your country passed a series of Special Laws
specifically designed to enhance national security, and has joined the United
States in its efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Your country's law enforcement
and military officials, in several high-profile arrests that captured the atten-
tion of the populace, took three suspects into custody who allegedly were
involved in terrorist-related activities. While these high-profile arrests oc-
curred at slightly different times and in different places, their commonality is
that the alleged wrongdoers were citizens of your country. However, the
commonality ends there. As events have unfolded, your country's treatment
of these individuals has varied greatly.
The first arrest stemmed from the capture of a young national actually
fighting for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. As a teenager, he discovered
Islam and came to adopt Taliban and al Qaeda beliefs. He traveled to Egypt
and Yemen to learn Arabic, trained for jihad in several training camps, and
was said to have interacted with Osama Bin Laden. After his arrest, this
individual was not treated pursuant to the Special Laws as an "enemy
combatant," a status which would have severely limited his constitutional
rights, but proceeded through your country's traditional criminal system. The
official spokesman for your president declared that, "the great strength of this
country is he will now have his day in court." He had his family with him
throughout the initial process, had a bail hearing, was provided the right to
counsel, eventually entered a plea agreement, and has begun to serve a
twenty year prison sentence, instead of indefinite confinement as an "enemy
combatant" or execution for treason. The deferential treatment was largely
due to his status as a citizen of your land.
The second individual was similarly born in your country and was
captured in Afghanistan allegedly fighting with Taliban forces. Unlike the
first individual, this accused was treated as an "enemy combatant" and was
immediately sent to a military jail. Your government argued that as an enemy
combatant, it could detain him indefinitely without formal charges or
proceedings and would allow him due process and access to counsel only
when it deemed it necessary. After a lengthy confinement in a military jail
without any hearing or even charges leveled against him, the Supreme Court
ordered that he was entitled to a meaningful hearing and ordered your
government either to produce evidence of his crimes or to release him. Your
government never used the citizenship exception, as it did with the previous
individual, to subject him to your land's traditional criminal procedures.
Instead, it treated him as one of the scores of foreigners captured in
Afghanistan. Ultimately, your government declared that this second indi-
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vidual no longer posed a threat to your country and entered into an agreement
whereby this individual, without ever being convicted of any crime, would
have his citizenship stripped, would be deported to his parent's native land,
and would be required to pledge never to return to your country.
The third individual was arrested in your land because he was suspected of
preparing a terrorist attack. This individual, despite being a citizen of your
land by virtue of being born there, was immediately held in indefinite
detention as a material witness and later as an "enemy combatant." Although
he has been jailed for several years without trial, he faces indefinite
confinement and only recently has been given the chance to meet with
counsel. Even after one of your federal judges ordered that this individual
either be charged with a crime or released, your government and its attorney
general have declared that it will continue to detain him indefinitely, without
trial, for the duration of hostilities in the war on terror.
Arguably the three accused were alleged to have waged war against your
land, yet they faced dramatically disparate treatment. Now consider this. The
first individual, who was afforded your country's traditional criminal pro-
cess, and had his day in court with right to counsel and other fundamental
rights, is Caucasian. The second, who was subject to potentially indefinite
confinement, ultimately was convicted of no crime, and was effectively
forced to agree to be expatriated from his land and have his citizenship
dissolved, is of Arab decent. The third, who remains in jail to this day and has
yet to face a trial, is an ethnic minority descendant from one of your country's
overseas territories, and as such, is an excellent example of the subordinate
citizenship status given to those islanders.
As is evident to any newspaper reader, the above depiction is not based on
a fictional portrayal, but on the actual events related to the arrests of John
Walker Lindh,1 Yaser Esam Hamdi,2 and Jose Padilla. While the cases of
these individuals may be more complex than the above suggests, the
disparate treatment of three similarly-situated individuals allows critics of
the judicial system to raise questions concerning the motivations behind and
basis for the disparate treatment.4 Though many believe that the United
States Government's vastly different treatment of these three individuals was
1. Ellen S. Podger, Jose Padilla and Martha Stewart: Who Shall be Charged with Criminal
Conduct?, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1059 (2005); Leti Volpp, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and
Alien Citizens, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1595 (2005).
2. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2002).
3. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F.Supp.2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, Padilla ex rel.
Newman v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
4. See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002); Thomas W. Joo, Presumed
Disloyal: Executive Power Judicial Deference and the Construction of Race Before and After
September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2002). See also "Rights and the New Reality;
Self-Inflicted Wounds; Secret Deportation Hearings, U.S. Citizens Denied Due Process While in
Custody. These Evoke Memories of Dictatorships and Undermine the Health of Our Democracy,"
L. A. TiMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at B12 (disparate treatment of Hamdi, Lindh, and Padilla drew questions
from Senator McCain and other leaders, including at least one federal judge).
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largely due to racial and class constructions,5 few, if any, scholars have fully
explored the subject.6 Those scholars who have addressed these events have
limited their analysis to the declared American enemy combatants-Jose
Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi.7 Nonetheless, the public criticisms of their
treatment do not stem from de jure citizenship distinctions established for
different groups. Instead, the public criticism, to the extent there has been
any, largely focuses on applying legal constructs to ethnically diverse
groups.8
The post-September llth events relating to the above well-known cases
are recounted here not to raise questions concerning the application of
criminal laws, 9 but to demonstrate that the fundamental legal and societal
construct known as citizenship, arguably the most important identity marker
in both its legal construction and application, has always included gradations
or levels of membership.10 In other words, different legal treatment of those
5. Natsu Taylor Saito, Interning the "Non-Alien" Other: The Illusory Protections Of Citizenship,
68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 208-10 (2005) (Padilla is both an internal Other by virtue of his race
and ethnicity, and perceived as an external Other as a result of his conversion to Islam and the
political associations attributed to him); Joanna Woolman, The Legal Origins Of The Term "Enemy
Combatant" Do Not Support Its Present Day Use, 7 J. L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 145, 159-60 (2005);
Eric K. Yamamoto, White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the Courts to Hold the
President Accountable for National Security Abuses, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 313-14 (2005)
(Lindh, a white American from a middle class family in California, fit the description for enemy
combatant, but the government declined to label him as such; Hamdi, a U.S. citizen of Arab descent,
and Padilla, a Puerto Rican, did not fit the description, but were labeled enemy combatants).
6. While not the focus of this project, a brief discussion of pertinent law relating to the treatment
of citizens suspected of disloyalty is perhaps in order. The leading case on the subject is Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866), where the Court addressed the propriety of a military court's jurisdiction
over a citizen who was not a member of a military force. The Court held that the military court had no
jurisdiction over such a person, and rejected the government's argument that the Bill of Rights did not
apply during war. Id. at 118-30. The Court concluded that the military trial violated Milligan's Sixth
Amendment right to a trial before and impartial jury and his Fifth Amendment's right to a grand jury.
Id. The second leading case on the subject is Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). In that case,
departing from Milligan, the Court refused to find that either the Fifth or Sixth Amendments
prevented a naturalized U.S. citizen accused of conspiring with a foreign wartime enemy to be tried
by a military tribunal. The Court found no distinction between citizen and foreign belligerents. Id. at
37-38. The Quirin Court distinguished the Milligan decision by noting that "Milligan, not being a
part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy, was a non-belligerent, not subject to the law
of war .... Id. at 45.
7. See, e.g., Juliet Stumpt, Citizens of an Enemy Land: Enemy Combatants, Aliens, and the
Constitutional Rights of the Pseudo-Citizen, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79 (2004). Many thanks are in
order to Professor Charles Pouncy for noting the failure of pundits to include John Walker Lindh in
the enemy combatants debates at a post-9/l1 civil rights conference at Florida International
University.
8. At least one other person has recently argued that the "enemy combatant" cases of Hamdi and
Padilla have blurred citizenship constructions. See Stumpt, supra note 7.
9. For a brilliant analysis of the civil rights versus national security debate post-9/l1, read:
THOMAS E. BAKER & JOHN F. STACK, AT WAR WITH CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES (Rowan &
Littlefield 2005).
10. Well known is the ongoing struggle with the caste system of India, a phenomenon
acknowledged even in election laws that prevents inciting hatred between the classes of citizens.
Brenda Cossman & Ratna Kapur, Secularism's Last Sigh: The Hindu Right, the Courts, and India's
Struggle for Democracy, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 113, 120. Another obvious example is the treatment of
Jews in Europe, who have a long history of being accorded less than full citizenship rights. This
treatment, dating to early in the Common Era, was memorialized by the Romans in the Theodosian
Code of 425 C.E. and Justinian Code of 570 C.E., prohibiting participation in government, and
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within a society who are supposedly equal is not only an old phenomenon, it
is also consistent with the citizenship construct's dark little secret. That secret
is the largely unexplored fact that the citizenship construct, although widely
accepted as requiring equality among those with the status of citizen, also
contains a lesser known aspect that fosters differences in the treatment of the
inhabitants within a society. These differences typically are more vivid and
capture greater attention during times of crises.'l In fact, during the recent
debates revolving around the appropriate level of civil rights protections
available to accused terrorists after September llth, some writers have
questioned the propriety of the treatment of Arab-Americans and Muslim-
Americans, while others have championed differences in citizenship, effec-
tively arguing that "some Americans are more equal than others." 12 In
discussing the post-September 11 th civil rights debate, one author observed
that "[t]he pertinent question is not one of balancing, but one of determining
which segments of American society deserve less constitutional protection
than others in national crises." 13 Thus, the concept of citizenship implies a
dialectic, 14 or a process of intellectual evolution and self-definition by means
of the negation and transcendence of opposing ideas, between inclusion
within a membership group and exclusion of nonmembers of the group, that
also defines the contours and meaning of the group itself.' 5
The tension in the application of the citizenship construct is not limited to
times of crises, 16 but, at least in the domestic sense, has repeatedly arisen
restricting life, livelihood, and property ownership. NORMAN F. CANTOR, THE SACRED CHAIN: THE
HISTORY OF THE JEWS 110 (HarperCollins 1994). Indeed, the Justinian Code prescribed death for
those who broke provisions requiring particular religious affiliations for all citizens. Thomas M.
Franck, Is Personal FreedomA Western Value?, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 593, 609 n.100 (1997).
11. See, e.g., Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 73, 1 stat. 596 (expired 1891) (making it a federal offense
to make false criticisms of the government or its officials, or to excite hatred of the people of the
United States); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (invalidating President Lincoln's suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (the World War I era
prosecution of war critics); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Japanese Internment);
Dennis v. United States 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding the McCarthy era twenty-year imprisonment
of individuals for teaching the works of Marx and Lenin).
12. See, e.g., Arvin Lugay, "In Defense of Internment": Why Some Americans Are More "Equal"
Than Others, 12 ASIAN L.J. 209 (2005) (reviewing MICHELLE MALKIN, IN DEFENSE OF INTERNMENT:
THE CASE FOR RACIAL PROFILING IN WORLD WAR Two AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004)). See also
Jack Utter, The Discovery Doctrine, the Tribes, and the Truth, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, June 7, 2000,
available at http://www.indiancountry.comcontent.cfm?id= 2541.
13. Lugay, supra note 12, at 209.
14. Raj Bhala, Hegelian Reflections on Unilateral Action in the World Trading System, 15
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 159, 187-190 (1997) (describing Hegelian dialectic); Michel Rosenfeld,
Comment: Spinoza's Dialectic and the Paradoxes of Tolerance: A Foundation for Pluralism?, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 767-770 (2003) (contrasting approaches to dialectic of Benedict de Spinoza
and G.W.F. Hegel).
15. ETIENNE BALIBAR, WE, THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE?: REFLECTIONS ON TRANSNATIONAL CITIZEN-
SHIP 50 (Princeton Univ. Press 2004) (describing citizenship as a "dialectic of conflicts and
solidarities"); WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM,
AND CrrIZENSIP 1 (2001) (describing citizenship and naturalization laws as playing out a "dialectic
of nation-building and minority rights").
16. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 2; Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1. For a brief review of each,
see supra note 6.
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when disfavored groups sought full membership.17 The current criticisms of
this government's treatment of Arab and Muslim citizens after September
llth are reminiscent not only of the World War II Japanese Internment
Cases, which are widely discussed in legal literature, 8 but also of the
exclusion of disfavored groups from the definition of social and political
citizenship prevalent throughout several thousand years of recorded his-
tory. 9 Specifically, this article intends to demonstrate how the concept of
citizenship in Western democracies has resulted in effects that are wholly
inconsistent with the purportedly liberal ethos constructing citizenship itself.
Indeed, this duality appears in the first writings on the subject, made over
two thousand years ago, when philosophers and politicians focused on
equality for members of society and advocated, in the same breath, the
exclusion of many who were both desirous of the status and, arguably,
otherwise eligible to obtain it.20 From its very genesis, then, the construct of
citizenship exhibits exclusionary as well as inclusive aspects; yet, the vast
majority of the literature on the subject focus on the more appealing inclusive
component of the construct. This article compares citizenship's egalitarian
aspects with its lesser-known or at least lesser-acknowledged, theoretical
aspects, and its more recent domestic applications, which have repeatedly
evidenced selective membership and exclusion.21 Part II explores various
components of both ancient and contemporary citizenship theory. This part
demonstrates that citizenship theory has always extolled the virtues of
equality but has also supported the exclusion of less favored groups from the
status. This part next explores the domestic development of the concept of
citizenship. It demonstrates that the American experience of citizenship fits
squarely within this article's central thesis: society's citizenship rhetoric
champions a model of equality and inclusion, but in practice, society denies
disfavored groups full social, civil, and political citizenship rights. Part II
17. The central thesis here is to expose the fact that the gradations of membership have not
merely arisen during the exigencies of war or political crises, but have always been part of the
obstacles faced by disfavored groups seeking full membership.
18. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag: The Continued Relevance of the Japanese
Internment in the Post-Hamdi World, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 307 (2006); Jerry Kang, Thinking Through
Internment: 1217 and 9/11, 9 ASIAN L.J. 195 (2002); Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege:
Japanese American Redress and the "Racing" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists", 8 ASIAN L.J. 1
(2001); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002); see also Erwin
Chermerinsky, Civil Liberties And the War on Terrorism, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2005); Thomas Healy,
The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847 (2005); Lee Epstein, Daniel E.
Ho, Gary Fing, Jeddrey A. Segal, The Supreme Court During Crises: How War Affects Only Non-War
Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2005); Earl M. Maltz, The Exigencies of War, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 861
(2005).
19. Recent scholarship on the war on terror has raised the questions of whether the concept of
citizenship is itself a limit on executive power. See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Citizenship Matters: The
Enemy Combatant Cases, 19 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 33 (2005). See also Utter, supra
note 12 (tracing the role of the state as "institutionalized superiority of one people over another, found
in the Discovery Doctrine" back to Aristotle).
20. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS BOOK III, ch. 5.
21. See Barron, supra note 19, at 34.
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demonstrates that American constitutional jurisprudence has sanctioned the
creation and maintenance of formal or de jure subordinate citizens, which
include this country's indigenous peoples and inhabitants of this country's
territorial island dependencies. Part IV questions whether American constitu-
tional jurisprudence has also established de facto subordinate citizens.22
Specifically, this section posits that certain groups, such as African-
Americans, were and perhaps still are less than full citizens despite attaining
such status after the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution. Unquestionably, the 1954 Brown v. Board of
Education decision effectively confirmed Plessy's "separate but equal"
paradox that created de facto subordinates until the 1950's. Part V explores
the related de jure subordination of groups that should have been eligible for
citizenship but were denied access to it because of the country's exclusionary
naturalization laws. Part VI analyzes T.H. Marshall's contributions to the
contemporary domestic citizenship theory, which focuses on the right of all
citizens to have access to civil, political, and social rights. Finally, Part VII
argues that an inclusive model for citizenship should be based on rights as
well as status.
II. THE CLASSIC CONSTRUCTION OF CITIZENSHIP
Although over thirty years ago a leading constitutionalist declared that the
concept of citizenship is of little significance in American constitutional
law, 23 the last two decades have witnessed what several writers have declared
"an explosion of interest in the concept of citizenship. 24 The renewed
theoretical focus was sparked by recent world-wide political events and
trends including, but not limited to, increasing voter apathy and long-term
welfare dependency in the United States, the resurgence of nationalist
movements in Eastern Europe, and the stresses created by increasingly
22. The once dejure and arguably still defacto subordinate citizenship status of women may be
further explored in the following articles. See, e.g., Gretchen Ritter, Women's Citizenship and the
Problem of Legal Parenthood in the United States in the 1960's and 1970's, 13 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 1
(2003); Catherine L. Fisk, In Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic Citizenship
in the 20th Century America, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 409 (2003); Christine Chinkin & Kate Paradine, Vision
and Reality: Democracy and Citizenship of Women in the Dayton Peace Accords, 26 YALE J. INT'L L.
103 (2001).
23. Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship In American Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 369 (1973). In
his book, Bickel argued that the Constitution's Preamble speaks of "We the People," not "We the
Citizens." As such, the Bill of Rights applies to all people, regardless of citizenship. ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 36 (1975). He argued that the concept of citizenship was not
important to the framers and that "the original Constitution presented the edifying picture of a
government that bestowed rights on people and persons, and held itself out as bound by certain
standards of conduct in its relations with people and persons, not with some legal construct called
citizen." Id.
24. Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on
Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS 352, 352 (1994) (further noting that the concept of citizenship had
been out of fashion since the late 1970s).
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multicultural and multiracial populations in Western Europe. Recent events
suggest that scholarly interest will continue to focus on the subject of
citizenship: these events include the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on
the United States and the United States' ensuing domestic and global war on
terrorism, with its consequences to Arabs and Muslims both at home and
abroad; the United States government's ineffective efforts at rescuing the
largely poor and African-American victims of the Louisiana Gulf Coast after
Hurricane Katrina, along with the widespread characterization of those
citizens as refugees; and the recent and ongoing ethnic uprisings in France.
While these events have led to a significant amount of public and media
attention, they have not led to much scholarly debate concerning their
implications on democratic and citizenship theories.
Nevertheless, citizenship is the most basic of all rights, "the right to have
rights. 26 Accordingly, citizenship is a broadly conceived concept typically
deemed a central component of Western civilization. It is the adhesive that
bonds the Constitution27 and binds the people to the republic. Citizenship
embodies the strongest link between the individual and the government.
28
A. Citizenship's Equality Component
With roots dating back to Athenian political leaders and philosophers such
as Solon and Aristotle, the concept of citizenship served a pivotal role in the
development of democratic order. Over 2,500 years old, the concept remains
to this day indispensable for the conceptual construction and understanding
of basic elements of political and legal order.29 The modern concept of
25. Id. The authors suggest that the academic debate is seen as a "natural evolution in the political
discourse because the concept of citizenship seems to integrate the demands of justice and
community membership-the central concepts of political philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s
respectively. Citizenship is intimately linked to the ideas of individual entitlement on the one hand
and of attachment to a particular community on the other. Thus it may help clarify what is really at
stake in the debate between liberals and communitarians." Id.
26. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 296 (Harcourt Brace & Co. 1979).
Arendt was one of the first to recognize that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were two sides of the
same coin rather than opposing philosophies of Right and Left.
27. Johnny Parker, When Johnny Came Home Again, A Critical Review of Contemporary Equal
Protection Interpretation, 37 How. L.J. 393, 396 (1994). Parker wrote that "[t]he concept of
citizenship is fundamental to constitutionally interpretation." Id.
28. Yaffa Zilbershats, Reconsidering the Concept of Citizenship, 36 TEx. INT'L L.J. 689, 690
(2001). Zilbershats, in noting that nationality is the manifestation between an individual and the
State, writes that there is no clear international criteria for defining this connection. Id. at 691. "There
is no clear international law stating in which circumstances a State must confer nationality upon a
person and when a person has the right to become a citizen. The uncertainty and lack of definition in
international law ensue from the fact that international law has sanctified the principle of State
sovereignty and non-intervention on the part of one State in the affairs of another." Id. As such, he
says that "State sovereignty has primarily been reflected in the power of the State to determine who
will be its permanent and preferred members, i.e., who will be its citizens. Indeed, every State has
established its own rules regarding when, how, and upon whom nationality will be conferred." Id.
29. Ulrich K. Preuss, The Ambiguous Meaning of Citizenship (Dec. 1, 2003) (unpublished paper,
presented at the University of Chicago Law School, Center for Comparative Constitutionalism),
available at http://ccc.uchicago.eduldocs/preuss.pdf.
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citizenship varies little from the classical concept of citizenship.
In Book III of his Politics, Aristotle set forth the foundational statement
concerning the concept's roots. He asserted that "a state is composite, like
any other whole made up of many parts; these are the citizens, who compose
it."'30 Equality among the citizenry is not only a deeply rooted component of
citizenship literature3I but is also a basis for the citizenship ideal.32 For
instance, Aristotle likened political and social citizenship to the communitar-
ian structure aboard a sailing vessel-although all sailors (or citizens) are
specialized in their tasks aboard ship, all are indispensable members of a
whole, without which the community cannot function.33 The classical con-
struction also deeply influenced contemporary philosophers, such as John
Locke, Alexis De Toqueville, and John Stuart Mill, who all recognized the
significance of equality among the participants within a society. John Locke
is often cited as a primary influence on the founding fathers because Thomas
Jefferson, in drafting the Declaration of Independence, admitted to drawing
liberally from Locke's Two Treatises on Government.34 In particular, the
famous assertion that all people are "endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness, ' 35 was drawn from Locke's work almost verbatim.36 Mill found
equality a central component of citizenship and democracy. He used equality
to advocate for granting citizenship status to women.37 De Toqueville, in a
similar vein, declared "the more I advance in the study of American society,
the more I perceive that the equality of condition is the fundamental fact from
which all others seem to derive."38
In turn, the founding fathers of this country focused on equality of
citizenship prior to the drafting of the Constitution. For instance, the authors
of the Federalist Papers addressed a form of citizenship endowed with equal
30. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS BOOK III, ch. 1.
31. Erwin Chemerinsky, Articles and Commentary on Equality: In Defense of Equality: A Reply
to Professor Western, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575 (1983) ("No value is more thoroughly entrenched in
Western culture than is the notion of equality.").
32. Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245 (1983) ("[I]implicit in the
values of citizenship ... is the notion of equal membership in the community.").
33. ARISTOTLE, supra note 20, ch. 4.
34. David L. Wardle, Reason to Ratify: The Influence of John Locke's Religious Beliefs on the
Creation and Adoption of the United States Constitution, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 291, 297 (2002).
35. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
36. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 168-69 (The Classics of Liberty Library
Special Edition, 1992). Locke writes that men are born free and equal in rights. While all men are
equal in the state of nature, civil society originates when men agree to delegate the function of
punishing transgressors. As such, the government is instituted by a "social contract," with limited
powers involving the reciprocity of obligations.
37. JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 99 (MIT Press, 1970). "That the principle
which regulates the existing social relations between the two sexes-the legal subordination of one
sex to the other-is wrong itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and
that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the
one side, nor disability on the other." Id.
38. ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 22 (1992). After visiting America, French-
man De Toqueville wrote this treatise about what America was like.
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rights. John Jay in Federalist No. 2 observed that "to all general purposes we
have uniformly been one people--each individual citizen everywhere enjoy-
ing the same national rights, privileges and protection."39 Madison, in a
Federalist paper, observed:
Who are to be the electors of the Representatives [in Congress]? Not the
rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the
haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of
obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body
of the people of the United States ... No qualification of wealth, of
birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the
judgement or disappoint the inclination of the people.4 °
With respect to the need to protect the citizenry, in another Federalist
paper, Madison notes:
It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society
against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society
against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily
exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a
common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are
but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a
will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society
itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate
descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a
majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable.41
This egalitarian vision was eventually, though not initially, tracked in the
supreme legal document of this country. The United States Constitution's
central citizenship provision is contained in the Fourteenth Amendment,
which provides: "All persons born and naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and the
state wherein they reside. ' 42 John Bingham, the primary drafter of the
Fourteenth Amendment, envisioned a concept centered on equality.43 He
described the rights of citizens as:
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 10 (John Jay). But see also JoHN P. ROCHE, THE EARLY
DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP (Cornell Univ. Press 1949). Prior to the American
Revolution, citizenship was a right granted by states and provided that "[a]n Englishman moving
from one colony to another automatically attained citizenship in the latter." Id. at 2.
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison).
41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
42. U.S. CONST. art. XIV, Sec. 2.
43. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Bing-
ham's Theory of Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717, 719 (2003) (arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Citizenship Clause envisioned a broad concept of citizenship).
[Vol. 20:557
THE CITIZENSHIP DIALECTIC
[T]he equality of all to the right to live; to the right to know; to argue
and to utter, according to conscience; to work and enjoy the product of
their toil ... the charm of that Constitution lies in the great democratic
ideals which it embodies, that all men, before the law, are equal in
respect of those rights ofIerson which God gives and no man or state
may rightfully take away.
The United States Supreme Court repeatedly used similar declarations
concerning citizenship.4 5 For instance, in Afroyim v. Rusk,46 Justice Black,
following Aristotle's language written over two thousand years earlier,
declared "the citizenry is the country and the country is the citizenry.,
47
Justice Brandeis declared in Ng Fung Ho v. White that the "loss of citizenship
was equivalent to the loss of everything that makes life worth living. 48 Over
time, both jurists and scholars have shed considerable light on the importance
of the term. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in Sugarman v. Dougall that, "In
constitutionally defining who is a citizen of the United States, Congress
obviously thought it was doing something, and something important.,
49
Indeed, it has evolved to become something more than just being born or
naturalized within the United States.50 The grant of citizenship is the formal
recognition of these concepts and guarantees certain rights and duties,
including suffrage 51 and the right to serve on a jury,52 as well as other
important constitutional rights.53 Its importance, however, does not merely
lie with the delineated rights identified by the courts and legislatures.54
Citizenship has been recognized as a core concept in a liberal democratic
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
46. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 253.
47. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257.
48. Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284. The Court made similar assessments in Vance v. Terrazas, 444
U.S. 252, 270-75 (1980) (spawning strong dissents from Justices Marshall, Stevens, and Brennan,
who demanded a high standard of evidence when determining the intent of a citizen to voluntarily
renounce those rights he acquired at birth).
49. 413 U.S. 634, 652 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "In constitutionally defining who is a
citizen of the United States, Congress obviously thought it was doing something, and something
important. Citizenship meant something, a status in and relationship with a society which is
continuing and more basic than mere presence or residence. The language of that Amendment
carefully distinguishes between 'persons' who, whether by birth or naturalization, had achieved a
certain status, and 'persons' in general. That a 'citizen' was considered by Congress to be a rationally
distinct subclass of all 'persons' is obvious from the language of the Amendment." Id.
50. Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 681,
691 (1997).
51. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Relationship Between Obligations And Rights of
Citizens, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1721 (2001).
52. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Hernandez v. Texas:
Legacies of Justice and Injustice, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 153 (2005); But see Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
53. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193,
1262-84 (1992).
54. Jonathan C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam: The History, Evolution, and Application
of Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 667 (1995).
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state and has become a central component of individual identity in this
society. 55 It is by virtue of an individual's citizenship status that the
individual is an equal member of the political community. 56 The Fourteenth
Amendment's Citizenship Clause theoretically prevents the states from
treating disfavored groups as outsiders or from denying them "full inclusion
in public life of the community., 57 Thus, it creates a sense of permanent
inclusion in the American political community in a non-subordinate condi-
tion.58 Many believe that because equality and belonging are inseparably
linked, 59 acknowledging citizenship status confers full, complete, and equal
belonging to the United States.60
The above construction of citizenship suggests that all of the individuals born or
naturalized in a society should be endowed with the right to be equals within that
society. In fact, Madison's construction suggests that there should be no differences
among the citizenry's rights, despite differences in class or education.6 1 Recent
declarations share those sentiments: "[i]n claiming citizenship, an individual
is-first and foremost-asserting the existence of a social relationship between
himself and others. Specifically, a citizen is (by definition) someone who can
properly claim the right to be treated as a fellow member of the political
community.'62 Thus, the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contem-
plates only one class of United States citizen.63 Madison and the other authors of
the Federalist Papers largely agreed.64 Accordingly, the term "American Citizen" is
an "expression of the general principles that ought to govern membership in a free
society... and it ought to confer equal rights."65
B. The Exclusionary Aspect
Despite this focus on equality, both United States federal courts and
Congress have either created or upheld levels or gradations of membership.
55. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizenship Talk: A Revisionist Narrative, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1689, 1690 (2001).
56. Ruth E. Gordon, Some Legal Problems With Trusteeship, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 301, 320-23
(1995).
57. Eskridge, supra note 51, at 1721 (quoting KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S
EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION (1993).
58. Id. But see Christina Duffy Burnett, United States: American Expansion and Territorial
Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797 (2005) (arguing that, in reading the Insular Cases, the Supreme
Court crafted a new kind of American territory, one who's citizens could be governed temporarily and
later be relinquished).
59. Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race And Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 3 (1988)
60. Drimmer, supra note 54, at 667.
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, supra note 40.
62. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 74 (Yale Univ. Press 1980). See
also Zietlow, supra note 43, at 731-32.
63. Zietlow, supra note 43, at 731-32.
64. James W. Fox, Jr., Citizenship, Poverty, and Federalism: 1787-1882,60 U. PITT. L. REV. 421,
439 (1999). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 52 (James Madison) ("[T]he door of this part of the Federal
Government[] is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or
old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.").
65. JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: 1608-1870 10 (1978).
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In addressing the classic constructions of the citizenship concept, historian
J.G.A. Pocock observes that "[t]his account of human equality excludes the
greater part of the human species from access to it."' 6 6 Citizenship's exclusion-
ary aspect, though containing substantial historical support, is largely unex-
plored in legal literature and decisions.67 Yet, the roots of citizenship's dual
nature are well established.
For example, in Aristotle's Politics, the philosopher championed equality
among members in one passage but in another observed:
Is he only a true citizen who has a share of office, or is the mechanic to
be included? If they who hold no office are to be deemed citizens, not
every citizen can have this virtue of ruling and obeying; for this man is a
citizen. And if none of the lower class are citizens, in which part of the
state are they to be placed?
He later declares:
For [if these individuals] are not resident aliens, and they are not
foreigners ... may we not so reply, that as far as this objection goes
there is no more absurdity in excluding them than in excluding slaves
and freedmen from any of the above-mentioned classes? It must be
admitted that we cannot consider all those to be citizens who are
necessary to the existence of the state ....
Since there are many forms of government there must be many
varieties of citizens and especially of citizens who are subjects .... 68
Citizenship's classical construction, as evinced in Aristotle's works, equated
the ideal of citizenship with virtue, in that "the good man and the good citizen
are the same .... Virtue, in this case, was strictly reserved for those
members of society who participated in the polity as "statesmen," i.e.,
persons fit to hold political office. Since polity participation was not a virtue
present in all Athenian community members, not everyone was entitled to
full citizenship. The ancient Greek political leader Solon (who invented
66. J.G.A. Pocock, The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times, 99 QUEENS QUARTERLY 1
(1992) (discussing the Greek origin of "classical" liberalism).
67. Saito, supra note 18 (arguing that the World War II Japanese internment was not aberrational,
and that the United States is presently repeating the same mistake by "racing" Arab Americans as
"terrorists"); Volpp, supra note 1 (arguing that post-9/l1, United States culture treats individuals of
Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim descent as racial minorities and accords them reduced respect and
protection).
68. ARISTOTLE, supra note 20.
69. ARISTOTLE, supra note 30. Aristotle concedes this ideal is not possible, i.e., that every
member of society be a virtuous person-the state is therefore imperfect, in that not every member
can be a citizen. He writes, "If the state cannot be entirely composed of good men, and yet each
citizen is expected to do his own business well, and must therefore have virtue, still inasmuch as all
the citizens cannot be alike, the virtue of the citizen and of the good man cannot coincide. All must
have the virtue of the good citizen-thus, and thus only, can the state be perfect; but they will not have
the virtue of a good man, unless we assume that in the good state all the citizens must be good." Id.
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Greek citizenship) created levels of participation in society to appease the
wealthy. Despite dramatically increasing the number of members of society
allowed to participate in the political process, Solon maintained the domi-
nance of large landholders by dividing the citizenry into four classes on the
basis of wealth.7 ° Thus, in ancient citizenship constructions, the capacity to
rule was more a matter of status than of ability.71 Even Aristotle who at first
presupposed a society of homogeneous free men, ultimately developed a
theory based on hierarchy, 72 in which a mechanic, for example, would be
excluded from the ranks of citizens, in large part because such an individual
typically has little interest in developing his mind.7 3 What results is that
although the classic vision recognized that the state was a composite of its
citizenship and that all citizens were equal, not all within a society were
deserving of the status of citizen.
The Roman Empire was the other civilization instrumental to citizenship's
classical construction. Although Rome may not have produced as much
well-known literature on the subject as did its counterpart to the east, its great
contribution lies in its grand application of the citizenship construct. Due to
the success of the Roman Empire, lasting effects of its expansion and
influence, including the construction of citizenship as a concept, have
affected almost every region of the world.
Rome's creation of a theory of universalism associated with citizenship is
the great transformation of the concept. 74 Rome eventually managed and
ensured the growth of its empire on the basis of a form of universal
citizenship of free men and a Stoic notion of universal brotherhood of
mankind.75 In many respects, the universalism inherent in the Roman
construction resembles the Greek construction's egalitarian notions that extol
the virtues of equality among the citizenry. The Roman approach, perhaps
due to the instrumental motivations of expansion, was far more inclusive
70. PETER RIESENBERG, CITIZENSHIP IN THE WESTERN TRADITION: PLATO TO ROUSSEAU 15 (N. C.
Univ. Press 1992); see also James W. Fox, Jr., Citizenship, Poverty, and Federalism: 1787-1882, 60
U. PITT. L. REv. 421, 429 (1999) (noting that Greeks developed a construction of citizenship that
combined political participation in the polis with membership in the polity). The first three classes of
the society-requiring 500, 300, and 200 measures of produce from their land-were eligible to hold
offices proportionate to their wealth; those with less than this wealth were members of the assembly
and could serve as jurors. JOSEPH A. ALMEIDA, JUSTICE AS AN ASPECT OF THE POLLS IDEA IN SOLON'S
POLITICAL POEMS 10-11 (Boston: Brill 2003).
71. RIESENBERG, supra note 70, at 6.
72. Id. at 45.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 53. But see Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. 393, 478 (1856) (Daniel, J.,
concurring). Justice Daniel argued that the emancipation of a former slave, under Roman law, did not
confer citizenship status on the slave. He assumed the status of the "lower grades of domestic
residents," which were called "freedmen" in Rome. Justice Daniel further noted that it was the
decline of the Roman empire when citizenship rights were extended; this resulted in the "proud
distinctions of the republic being gradually abolished[.]" Id. (quoting EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY
OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE vol. 3, chap. 44, at 183 (London 1825). For
discussion at length of Scott and Rome's historical influence in the decision, see infra Part IV.A.
75. Scott, 60 U.S. at 478.
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than the Greek manifestations. This is due, perhaps, to the Stoics'
development of Natural Law as the correct law of the nation and the
world. Although Rome could only pass laws of convention, the notion of
being a citizen of the world, as well as a Roman citizen, was fostered by
both Roman law and Stoic ideology. The ideal nation-state was a
universal nation-state. The innovation of Rome's citizenship ideal in the
Natural Law context stems from the Romans' understanding of liberty,
freedom from involuntary servitude, and freedom to exercise specific
rights and to assume specific duties. Under this ideal of liberty, the Roman
people were their own masters, free from internal domination by a
monarch or by a political faction, and free from subjection to any foreign
power. The Roman people were thus free to exercise their sovereignty,
free to determine their destiny, and were free to follow those laws and
customs that represented the Roman way of life.7 6
As an individual, the Roman was free from the impositions of slavery;
as a citizen, he was free from arbitrary exactions of fellow citizens,
including magistrates. He was free to enjoy a variety of rights: free to
elect his own occupation, free to marry the woman of his choice, free to
own slaves and to dominate his wife and children. As a citizen, he was
free to participate in the assembly, free to vote, free to hold public
office, [and] free to serve in the army.77
Despite this fervently egalitarian ideal, gradations of membership existed
even in this model.78 For instance, by the fourth century, the plebeian class
could hold a number of political positions, although they were still restricted
from the higher rungs of political power. After a bitter Samnite War also
during this time period, Rome offered full citizenship rights to several former
enemy towns, including Aricia, but many Latin cities were granted a new
kind of second-class or limited citizenship.79 The inhabitants of these Latin
cities were granted legal and economic rights, but not full political ones.8°
During this post-Dark Age and pre-Renaissance period, nation-states recog-
76. Id.
77. J. RUFUS FEARS, Antiquity: The Example of Rome, in AN UNCERTAIN LEGACY: ESSAYS ON THE
PURSUIT OF LIBERTY 7 (Edward B. McLean ed., Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute
1997).
78. E.T. SALMON, ROMAN COLONIZATION UNDER THE REPUBLIC 117 (Cornell University Press
1970). Some of these gradations were designated by community, its location, and relationship to
Rome. Id. at 40, 70. In other instances, gradations affected individual non-Romans living within Italy.
Id. at 102, 117-18. For example, citizenship was withheld from those who could not speak Latin, Id.
at 149, while xenophobia and an "innate conviction of their own superiority" were demonstrated by
the continuing expulsion of even enfranchised immigrants. Id. at 102.
79. Id. at 50.
80. Id.
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nized the concept of citizenship, but equally recognized its component of
gradations of membership."'
C. The Modem Construction
1. Theory of the Modem Construction
Contemporary domestic citizenship theory was significantly influenced by
ancient philosophers as well as seventeenth and eighteenth century philoso-
phers. It should therefore be of little surprise that the modern rhetorical
construction of citizenship focuses on equality. This American construction
of citizenship, which is the theoretical bedrock of twentieth century citizen-
ship studies, seems to refer not only to delineated rights but also to a broad
concept of equal membership and incorporation into the body politic. 82 A
correlative to this concept is the "membership facet" of citizenship: the sense
of belonging and participation in the national community.83 This membership
facet, which contains both legal and conceptual aspects, demonstrates a
psychological component of citizenship. This construction suggests that the
anointment of citizenship is an important title that goes to the heart of the
individual's feeling of inclusion as well as the collective citizenry's sense of
the value and virtue of the democracy.
Citizenship's membership facet exhibits a subjective psychological or
"imagined quality" to citizenship.84 The formal recognition of rights, as well
as the imagined attributes of the status, demonstrates the importance in the
construction of self for those within and outside the status classification.
These citizen attributes are supposed to define who the people are in "We the
People."85 Michael Walzer observed that "[wle who are already members do
the choosing, in accordance to our understanding of what membership means
in our community and of what sort of a community we want to have."86
When one considers the concept's subjective or imagined qualities it may
help explain why, despite the widely held belief that citizenship confers full
membership and equality, these lofty goals are often not met for racial and
ethnic minorities and other marginalized groups. Indeed, American history is
81. For a comprehensive collection of works discussing how nation-states recognized the concept
of citizenship with gradations of membership, see PRIVILEGES AND RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP: LAW AND
THE JURIDICAL CONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY (Julius Kirshner & Laurent Mayali ed. 2002).
82. Ediberto RomAn, The Alien Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S. Colonialism,
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1998).
83. Id.
84. BENEDICT R. ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD
OF NATIONALISM (1991); see also Catherine Powell, Lifting Our Veil of Ignorance: Culture,
Constitutionalism, and Women's Human Rights in Post-September 11 America, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 331,
343 (2005) ("We know also from Benedict Anderson's work that culture and community are
imagined, often in response to, in solidarity with, or in opposition to colonialism, trade, immigration,
and other transnational projects").
85. ERIC FONER, WHO OWNS HISTORY 150-56 (2002) (referencing U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
86. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 32 (1983).
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replete with instances where bias takes the place of sound inclusive egalitar-
ian theory and those who should be (or actually were) provided with citizen
status do not enjoy the benefits of citizenship. 7 Though one can aptly
demonstrate the tension concerning who are "the Americans" or "the People"
by tracing the history of those who challenged their lesser citizenship status,
the debate concerning this country's national identity persists today. For
instance, Peter Brimelow's 1995 book Alien Nation warned that non-white
immigrants were destroying America's ethno-cultural community.88 Accord-
ing to Brimelow, himself an Englishman, this American culture is grounded
in a shared European ancestry. More recently, Samuel Huntington questions
whether the increasing multiculturalism in the United States will disintegrate
into the type of ethnic strife that destroyed Yugoslavia.8 9
Irrespective of whether one is willing to accept these recent ethnocentric
opinions, this country has repeatedly used the citizenship construct in
exclusionary ways. 90 Indeed, one leading citizenship scholar recently ob-
served that with respect to immigrants, indigenous people and the inhabitants
of the island territories, the Supreme Court cases establishing the rights of
those groups established "a vision of the United States as... a nation that
defined itself in ethno-racial terms as Anglo-Saxon." 9t Many, such as
African-Americans, Latinos and Latinas, Asians and Arab-Americans, would
argue that they have existed in an anomalous status by holding the title of
citizen yet enjoying less than full membership status. Whereas ancient
societies like Greece formally recognized inferior groups, such as "metics"
or "freedmen," modem citizenship theory does not seem to support inferior
classes of citizens. Irrespective of whether one accepts the suggestion that
there are levels of citizenship, federal decisions have, at best, been slow in
granting full rights to all those holding citizenship status, particularly with
respect to racial and ethnic minorities.
As demonstrated above, the focus of the domestic literature on the modem
constructions of citizenship emphasize equality and inclusion. Although the
87. Such benefits relate to certain fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, to serve on juries,
protection of laws, just to name a few. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Jury Service As Political
Participation Akin To Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995). This also suggests that citizenship is
subjective and is to be applied. WALZER, supra note 86, at 32. Accordingly, when the citizenry,
through their officials, decide on membership, "whether like us or not we have to consider them as
well as ourselves." Id.
88. See generally PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRA-
TION DISASTER (Random House 1995). But see, Lauren Gilbert, Fields of Hope, Fields of Dispair:
Legisprudential and Historic Perspectives on the AgJobs Bill of2003, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 417,474
(2005) (noting that xenophobic displays in a mainstream publication from a respected American
academic community were surprising).
89. Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, National Identity In A Muti-icultural Nation: The
Challenge of Immigration Law and Immigrants, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1347 (2005) (surveying SAMUEL
HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES To AMERICA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY).
90. Aleinikoff, supra note 55, at 1690.
91. Aleinikoff, supra note 55, at 1692. "By defining insiders, the concept of citizenship necessarily
defines outsiders; and by guaranteeing full and equal rights for those within the charmed circle it supports fewer
rights--or at least less attention-for those outside the circle." Aleinikoff, supra note 55, at 1692.
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modem theory of citizenship extols the virtues of equality as much as the
ancients did, the modem practice denies equality to many members within
society. While in ancient times the gradations were largely based upon wealth
and gender, in the heterogeneous society that became the United States, the
gradations also manifest themselves in terms of race and ethnicity.
92
Little of the modem discourse of democracy or citizenship would question
the concept of equality, let alone accept levels of membership. Indeed, the
United States Congress, as well as the Supreme Court, has repeatedly
addressed the importance of the citizen in a democracy, but has never openly
admitted to endorsing a hierarchy of inclusion.93 In analyzing the arguably
most significant twentieth century citizenship decisions-Afroyim v. Rusk
and Reid v. Covert,94 one can fairly easily conclude that by defining insiders,
citizenship necessarily defines outsiders, and by guaranteeing full and equal
rights for those within the charmed circle, it supports fewer rights--or at least
less attention-for those outside it.95
The domestic creation of membership levels is a result of using legal
fictions to create subordinate rights. The role that constructions of subordina-
tion, including national origin and race, have played in excluding members
from the United States' body politic, at the very least, calls into question the
sincerity of the egalitarian citizenship rhetoric. Historically, full birthright
citizenship and citizenship through naturalization (the other primary means
of attaining membership) were attainable goals for those not considered to be
racial minorities but remained elusive or illusory for other classifications of
minorities.
American citizenship unfortunately has all too often been a tool for
including Caucasians and excluding African-Americans,96 indigenous
peoples,97 and other non-whites.9 8 For instance, the legal doctrines created
over a century ago to maintain African-American slave status9 9 and to deport
92. Cf U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (recognizing a woman's right to suffrage).
93. See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (holding that under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
government had no power to rob a citizen of his citizenship under a statute that provided that a citizen
should lose his citizenship for voting in political election in a foreign state); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1 (1957) (holding that the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice that extend
court-martial jurisdiction to persons accompanying the armed forces outside of the continental limits
of the United States could not be constitutionally applied to the trial of civilian dependents of
members of the armed forces overseas, in times of peace, for capital offenses).
94. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
95. Aleinikoff, supra note 55, at 1690.
96. See Scott, 60 U.S. at 481-82 (holding that African Americans are not citizens as contemplated
by the federal or state constitutions).
97. See Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 693, 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822) (holding that Native
Americans are not citizens, but are distinct tribes or nations).
98. Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power Over The "Other": Indians, Immigrants,
Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate International Law, 20 YALE L.
POL'Y REv. 427 (2002).
99. See Abel A. Bartley, The Fourteenth Amendment: The Great Equalizer of the American
People, 36 AKRON L. REv. 473, 481 (2003). Despite adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, most
former slaves found their status little changed. While the amendment ensured that humans would no
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and exclude legal immigrants are still used to maintain de jure and de facto
inferior classes of citizens in the United States. On its face, the law
subordinates the citizenship rights of the inhabitants of this country's island
territories and its indigenous peoples. The law also effectively subordinates
the citizenship rights of other minorities, such as African-Americans.
Despite this reality, the central concept of citizenship in the United States
Constitution is not based on inequality but equality. The primary source for
citizenship within this country, the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is a post-Reconstruction amendment specifically aimed to
provide former slaves the political rights associated with citizenship. Al-
though the text of this clause centers on the notion of equality among the
citizenry, in practice many citizens, particularly those of color, have been
repeatedly denied the benefits of equal treatment.'oo The inconsistent treat-
ment of this group stems from centuries-old constitutional doctrines based on
xenophobic, nativist, and racist sentiments that gave the political branches of
government complete or "plenary" power over these groups, allowing for the
disparate treatment of disfavored citizens.'o Those over whom the United
States government exercises complete power were, in effect, deemed by the
government to be "outsiders" and not true citizens. 102 For some, the exclusion-
ary nature of citizenship evinces a relationship between governments and the
governed that can always be dissolved.
10 3
longer be considered property, it did not grant equality. Institution of "Black Codes" in many states
"returned the belief in subhumans and restored the idea of human chattel.... Collectively, the 'Black
codes' were intended to reduce the status of African Americans to a level just above slavery and to
demolish thoughts of racial equality."
100. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995), numerous instances of unequal treatment".., reflective of a system of racial caste only
recently ended, are evident in our workplaces, markets and neighborhoods. Job applicants with
identical resumes, qualifications, and interview styles still experience different receptions, depending
on their race. White and African-American consumers still encounter different deals. People of color
looking for housing still face discriminatory treatment by landlords, real estate agents, and mortgage
lenders. Minority entrepreneurs sometimes fail to gain contracts though they are the low bidders, and
they are sometimes refused work even after winning contracts. Bias both conscious and unconscious,
reflecting traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must come down if
equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become this country's law and
practice." Id. at 273-74 (references omitted).
101. Saito, supra note 98; Bartley, supra note 99. Never changed since the adoption of the
Constitution is the clause giving Congress "[p]ower to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States .... " U.S.
CONST. Art IV § 3. Native Americans in the United States have long been subject to plenary powers of
the United States, variously attributed to the Constitution's war powers (Art. I § 8), treaty powers
(Art. II § 2) and commerce clauses (Art. I § 8). Lawrence Baca, The Legal Status ofAmerican Indians,
4 HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIANS 230, 231 (Smithsonian 1988). Finally, while the Thirteenth
Amendment superseded the U.S. CONST. Art. IV § 2 requirement that slaves be returned to their
owners, as noted earlier, it did not grant equality to persons of color, hence facilitating adoption of
Jim Crow laws in several states, which were ratified by the famous doctrine of "separate but equal" in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
102. Saito, supra note 98.
103. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 53 (1975).
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2. Development of the Modem Construction
In the 1800s, the United States Supreme Court began articulating a plenary
powers doctrine, defined as a full or complete power of Congress, that
required courts to defer to Congress when faced with challenges to official
conduct.' 4 The Supreme Court relied upon the plenary powers doctrine to
justify turning a blind eye to government actions that subordinated certain
groups by discriminating against indigenous peoples, inhabitants of the
United States' possessions, and immigrants. The doctrine was and continues
to be used as a weapon to disenfranchise those groups universally recognized
as the most vulnerable.1 0 5 The plenary power doctrine and a similar one
applied to African-Americans form the central constitutional doctrine that
supports the disenfranchisement of millions of Americans. The disparate
treatment of these groups provokes this criticism concerning the citizenship
jurisprudence's rhetoric concerning equality.
The period from the third decade of the nineteenth century to the third
decade of the twentieth century is the significant juridical period when the
Supreme Court and Congress attempted to define what groups were true
American citizens.10 6 The United States Supreme Court and the Congress
responded to this question by excluding every statistically significant racial
minority group from full citizenship status. 10 7 Between 1823 and 1922, the
United States Supreme Court, consistent with the classical constructions of
the construct, reiterated the importance of citizenship in a democracy but
endorsed a model of differentiated levels of membership. In a series of
decisions dealing with immigration, national security, and overseas expan-
sion, the Court endorsed the unequal treatment and inferior status of various
groups that should have been considered citizens. These cases include the
infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford'0 8 and Plessy v. Ferguson10 9 decisions with
respect to African-Americans; Elk v. Wilkins, " 0 United States v. Kagama,l l1
104. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (upholding a law that subjected
Native Americans to federal law as valid and constitutional; being within the limits of the United
States, they are subject to acts of Congress).
105. Saito, supra note 98, at 427.
106. Id. at 437-47. Despite the likely assumption that the English doctrine of jus soli (one who is
born within a nation's jurisdiction is a citizen of the country) would govern citizenship rights in
America, the United States did not apply this doctrine to racial minorities. Any doubts about these
exclusions were clarified in the Dred Scott decision, which held that blacks could not be citizens, even
if free persons-a rule until the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
107. See id. at 449-77. Even though after 1870 naturalization was open also to blacks, in only one
case did a petitioner for citizens'hip even attempt to assert a claim other than on the basis of being
"white." See, e.g., IAN HANEY-LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW (N. Y. Univ. Press 1996).
108. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
109. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that a statute requiring railroads carrying passengers to
provide equal but separate accommodations for white or colored races was constitutional).
110. 112 U.S. 94 (1884) (holding that an Indian born a member of one of the Indian tribes within
the United States, which still exists and is recognized as a tribe by the government of the United
States, who has voluntarily separated himself from his tribe and taken up his residence among the
white citizens of a state, but who has not been naturalized or taxed or recognized as a citizen, either by
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and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock'12 with respect to indigenous peoples; the
Chinese Exclusion Cases1 3 with respect to Asian immigrants; and the
Insular Cases'1 4 with respect to the inhabitants of the island conquests. In
each of these decisions, racial and ethnic minority groups challenged the
propriety of governmental action that discriminated against them. In each
decision, the Court used similar racial and xenophobic justifications to
uphold the disparate treatment. With the exception of the treatment of
African-Americans, when certain groups challenged violations to their con-
stitutional rights, the Supreme Court constitutionally justified deference to
the political branches of the government by relying upon the plenary powers
doctrine.
The plenary powers doctrine developed as an extension of the inherent
powers doctrine during this country's nineteenth century colonial expansion.
Beginning in 1822, the Supreme Court upheld the federal government's
doctrine of inherent plenary powers over the indigenous people of this land,
the inhabitants of the island colonies, and immigrants in entry and exclusion
proceedings. The decisions that established and first applied the plenary
powers doctrine to various outsider groups included: United States v.
Kagama, 1 5 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 1 6 Jones v. United States,"
17
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,"8 Fong Yue Ting v. United States," 9
Stephens v. Cherokee Nation,120 Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock,'2' Lone Wolf
the United States or by the state, is not a citizen of the United States, within the Fourteenth
Amendment).
111. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
112. 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (holding that Congress may pass laws that are in conflict with
treaties made with the Native Americans).
113. These cases grew out of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which prevented immigration of
Chinese laborers. See Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 47 Cong. Ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (May 6, 1882).
Upon its original sunset, the law was expanded ten years later to tighten all immigration and travel
from China. See Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Persons into the United States, 52 Cong. Ch.
60, 27 Stat. 25 (May 5, 1892). For more on the immigration of Chinese into the U.S., see Waverly B.
Lowell ed., National Archives and Records Administration, Paper 99, Chinese Immigration and
Chinese in the United States,(1996), available at http://www.archives.govllocations/finding-aids/
chinese-immigration.html.
114. The Insular Cases, several separate opinions during the first two decades of the Twentieth
Century, determined the status and applicability of the United States Constitution to territories,
facilitating U.S. imperialism without granting full citizenship rights to territorial residents. For a
revisionist view of the doctrine established by the cases, see Christina Duffy Burnett, United States:
American Expansion and Territorial Annexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 797 (2005).
115. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
116. 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (holding that Congress has power, even in times of peace, to exclude
aliens from, or prevent their return to, the United States, for any reason it may deem sufficient).
117. 137 U.S. 202 (1890) (holding that Congress can pass legislation concerning Guano Islands
discovered by citizens of the U.S., and to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the U.S. courts to such
islands).
118. 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (declaring constitutional an act by Congress that provides for the
exclusion from admission into the United States of certain classes of aliens).
119. 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (reaffirming that the power to exclude or to expel aliens is vested in the
political departments of the government).
120. 174 U.S. 445 (1899) (stating that the lands of the Cherokee Nation are not held in individual
ownership, but are public lands, held for the equal benefit of all the members).
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v. Hitchcock,122 De Lima v. Bidwell, 123 Downes v. Bidwell, 124 Goetze v.
United States,'125 Dooley v. United States, 126 The Diamond Rings,127 Hawaii
v. Mankichi,128 Kepner v. United States,1 2 9 Dorr v. United States, t 30 Huus v.
Porto [sic] Rico S.S. Co.,'31 Balzac v. Porto [sic] Rico.1
3 2
In each of the above cases, the United States Supreme Court concluded
that even the most basic liberty protections, as a matter of a constitutional
law, did not apply to these groups. The Court based its holdings on
international law principles and found that because the government's politi-
cal branch (Congress) was primarily responsible for national security, issues
that touched upon the status of individuals from sovereigns within and
without the physical boundaries of the United States should be addressed
primarily by the political branch of government and not the judicial branch.
The doctrine that ultimately became the plenary powers doctrine evolved
over a series of decisions that purportedly based their determinations upon
national security, but it was also used to espouse racist and xenophobic
principles.
The doctrine is perhaps more widely recognized in the immigration area
and was first developed in the immigration setting in the so-called Chinese
Exclusion Cases. In Chae Chan Ping, the Court in 1889 upheld the exclusion
of legal Chinese residents and concluded that courts would not interfere with
the government's action because it derived from the government's authority
over national security. 133 Three years later, in 1892 in Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, the Court upheld an exclusion of a Japanese immigrant
121. 187 U.S. 294 (1902) (holding that full administrative power is was possessed by Congress
over Indian tribal property).
122. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
123. 182 U.S. 1 (1901) (holding that upon the ratification of the treaty with Spain, Porto [sic]
Rico ceased to be a foreign country and became a territory of the U.S., and that duties were no longer
collectible upon merchandise brought from that island).
124. 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (holding that because Porto [sic] Rico was not a part of the U.S. for
purposes of Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress can impose a duty on goods
shipped from Porto [sic] Rico to the U.S.).
125. 182 U.S. 221 (1901) (holding that Hawaii and Porto [sic] Rico were not foreign countries for
purposes of the tariff laws of the United States).
126. 183 U.S. 151 (1901) (holding that on the cession of Puerto Rico to the United States, the
U.S. could no longer levy duties on goods shipped from the U.S. into Puerto Rico).
127. 183 U.S. 176 (1901) (holding that the Philippines, after their cession to the U.S. by Spain,
was not a foreign country for purposes of the tariff laws of the U.S.).
128. 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (accepting the cession made by the Republic of Hawaii, and continuing
the municipal legislation of the islands, not contrary to the U.S. Constitution, until Congress should
otherwise determine).
129. 195 U.S. 100 (1904) (holding that because Congress had enacted a statutory Bill of Rights
for the Philippines that prohibited double jeopardy, such provision barred an appellate court from
finding a criminal defendant guilty after acquittal by trial court).
130. 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (stating that the right of trial by jury was not extended by the federal
constitution, without legislation and of its own force, to the Philippine Islands).
131. 182 U.S. 392 (1901) (holding that ports in Puerto Rico were ports within the U.S. for
purposes of the U.S. coastwise laws).
132. 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury does not apply to territories
belonging to the U.S. that have not been incorporated into the Union).
133. 130 U.S. 582.
THE CITIZENSHIP DIALECTIC
without a hearing, 134 invoking the "accepted maxim of international law that
every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it
may see fit to prescribe."'' 35 As it subsequently explained in the 1936 decision
of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,136 the theory of inherent
plenary powers was premised essentially upon concerns over international
law principles that recognized a nation-state as having the inherent power to
take its place among the sovereign nations of the world despite being a
government of limited and enumerated powers. 1
37
III. SUBORDINATES IN LAW
The Court used the plenary powers (and other similar powers with respect
to African-Americans) to create gradations of membership within American
society. This construction of membership levels has resulted in the subordina-
tion of the rights of two types of groups within the United States political
structure.
The first group includes those who are subordinate in law, who derive
their membership not from the Fourteenth Amendment but from the
inherent powers of the political branches of government and the Territo-
rial Clause of Article Four of the United States Constitution. This group
includes indigenous people and the territorial island people. There can be
little question concerning the subordinate nature of their rights. The
United States Congress has plenary or total power to govern them,
including the ability to nullify any local laws, and may enact federal
legislation that it deems appropriate. Although all indigenous people, as
well as the inhabitants born on the overseas island territories, are United
States citizens (nationals in the case of Samoans), they hold a very
different and an inferior kind of citizenship.
The second group includes those who may be subordinate members in
fact. This classification is far more controversial because this group's
members are Fourteenth Amendment citizens, and yet their treatment, after
their formal grant of citizenship, raises questions as to whether in fact they
are equal members of society. Members of this group may include African-
Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities.
We will first examine the de jure subordinates, including this land's
indigenous peoples and this country's island territories inhabitants. The focus
134. 142U.S.651.
135. Id. at 659.
136. 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) ("The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make
treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned
in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of
nationality.").
137. Id.
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in the following section will then shift to the defacto group of subordinates,
who are less equal than other American citizens.
A. The Indigenous People
If the primary means to attain United States citizenship is to be born on
United States soil, indigenous peoples, because they are indigenous, should
accordingly be considered citizens. However, they are excluded from citizen-
ship. Their disenfranchised status stems from the plenary powers doctrine.1 38
As mentioned, this doctrine is premised on the notion that the political
branches of the federal government are responsible for the nation's security
and for its relations with other sovereigns.1 39 Since indigenous tribes were
seen as part of sovereign nations within the United States, the doctrine was
applied to them in a variety of ways. Paradoxically, a doctrine premised upon
the authority of the political branches of the government to protect the people
of the United States from a foreign enemy was used to justify the continued
subjugation and mistreatment of the original inhabitants of this land. Thus,
the original inhabitants of the United States were deemed a potential foreign
threat from within the United States.
The plenary power of Congress over the indigenous nations stems from a
series of Supreme Court decisions that began in 1823.140 The doctrine
endorsed repeated abuses of the indigenous peoples' rights, including the
continuous breaches of treaties they entered into with the United States
government and the continuous theft of their lands. 4 1 The doctrine justified
the Supreme Court's imposition of limited membership rights for the indig-
enous people and the continued use of racist stereotypes to maintain paternal-
istic "wardship" over the indigenous people, thus furthering violations of
property and other rights.' 42 Chief Justice John Marshall described the
attitude of that era: "[t]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce
savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn
138. For a brief history and analysis of this doctrine and its application with United States Native
Americans, see VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, & CONSTITUTIONAL
TRIBULATIONS 21-31 (Univ. of Tex. Press 1999) (offering a full historical analysis of the relationship
between the United States Constitution and Native Americans).
139. Saito, supra note 98, at 436 (discussion of how the plenary powers doctrine has been
asserted over Native Americans and other immigrants).
140. See DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE
MASKING OF JUSTICE 25-27, 45 (Univ. of Tex. Press 1997) (this book discusses several landmark cases
where the United States Supreme Court truncated Indian human rights). See also DELORIA & WILKINS,
supra note 138, at 29.
141. See generally, DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (Holt, Rinehart and
Winston 1972) (giving eyewitness accounts of the U.S. government's attempts to acquire Native
Americans' land by using threats, deception, and murder); VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF
BROKEN TREATIES (Dell Publ'g Co., 1974) (raising questions about the status of Native Americans
within the political landscapes); GLORIA JAHODA, THE TRAIL OF TEARS (Random House Group, Ltd.
1975) (describes how white settlers forced Indian tribes of plains).
142. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR. THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT (Oxford
Univ. Press 1990).
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chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country was to
leave the country a wilderness."'' 43 In the 1823 case of Johnson v. McIntosh,
the Court began developing what was going to become the doctrine justifying
the taking of indigenous lands by looking to the international legal principle
of discovery,' which gave the first Western power the power to "discover"
new lands the exclusive right to that land against other Western powers and
the power "to acquir[e] the soil from the natives, and [establish] settlements
upon it."' 145 In Worcester v. Georgia, Justice Marshall seemed to recognize
the indigenous peoples' sovereignty, declaring that the United States govern-
ment "manifestly consider[s] the several Indian nations as distinct political
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is
exclusive." 146 But, this notion of sovereignty was soon unmasked in United
States v. Rogers, where the Supreme Court stated that the federal courts had
jurisdiction over crimes committed in a reservation. 147
In the 1831 decision of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,148 also known as the
Cherokee Cases, the Cherokee Nation attempted to halt the State of Geor-
gia's attempt to seize Cherokee land. In dismissing the Cherokees' claim, the
Court found the indigenous territory was part of a domestic dependent nation
that the United States nonetheless held title to, irrespective of the Cherokee's
will. 149 Professor Sarah Cleveland recently observed that the decision not
only crippled the Cherokee Nation's ability to sue in United States courts, it
placed the indigenous people "in a 'no-man's land' status of being neither
citizens of the United States nor aliens of a sovereign foreign state.' 50 This
language makes it clear that as early as 1831 the United States Supreme
Court implicitly created an alien-citizen paradox applicable to this country's
indigenous people. 15 1 In this paradoxical state, the individuals within this
group are neither full citizens with all the rights associated with the status nor
143. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573 (1823) ("The exclusion of all other Europeans,
necessarily gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the
natives, and establishing settlements upon it. It was a right with which no European could interfere. It
was a right which all asserted for themselves, and to the assertion of which, by others, all asserted.").
144. See Utter, supra note 12. See also VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN
INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 2-6 (Univ. of Tex. Press 1983); DELORIA & WILKINS, supra note 138, at
4-5; WILKINS, supra note 140, at 31-32.
145. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573; see also VINE DELORIA, JR., OF UTMOST GOOD FAITH 6-37 (Straight
Arrow Books 1971); Utter, supra note 12.
146. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 557 (1832) (holding that the state of Georgia did not
have the right to redraw boundary lines negotiated by treaty between the Indian tribes and Congress).
147. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846) (holding that Congress may, by law, punish any
offense committed in a territory occupied by the Native Americans and not within the limits of any
state).
148. 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (holding that an Indian tribe within the United States was not a foreign
state within the meaning of the Constitution).
149. Id.
150. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent In Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 T)X. L. REV. 1 (2002).
151. See, e.g., Romin, supra note 82. In this work, the author examines the anomalous
second-class citizenship of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, who hold a status with attributes of both
citizen and foreigner.
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are they completely foreign because they have some form of citizenship.' 52
The subordinate as well as paradoxical status of the indigenous people was
further confirmed in the 1884 case of Elk v. Wilkins. t 5 3 John Elk, an
indigenous person, renounced his tribal membership, became a Nebraska
resident and sought to register to vote.1 54 The State of Nebraska rejected
Elk's application because he was not a citizen, despite the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 155 The Elk Court determined that the Fourteenth
Amendment established that citizenship was available only to persons who at
birth were completely subject to United States' jurisdiction.1 56 Because
indigenous nations were "distinct political communities" "within the territo-
rial limits of the United States," they were not completely subject to United
States jurisdiction. Noting the exclusive as well as exclusionary nature of
United States citizenship, the Court concluded "no one can become a citizen
of a nation without its consent" and because indigenous people "form[ed] no
part of the people entitled to representation," they "were never deemed
citizens. 157
Thus, even after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the United
States courts continued to struggle with indigenous peoples' citizenship
rights.' 58 Despite Elk's being born in America before the Americans had
"discovered" America, the Elk decision established that the indigenous
people of America were wards of the United States' Anglo-Saxon majority.
The United States has always viewed these people, despite being born in the
United States, as different from full or first-class citizens.1 59 Even after the
Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, the Supreme Court concluded that
indigenous peoples were not citizens by birthright. In an effort to protect the
perception of what was an American, courts became resolute in not diluting
citizenship with that which was perceived to be an inferior class of people.
The government used the pretext that indigenous peoples were part of a
"distinct political community" within the United States, and that they had
never engaged in the social compact to swear allegiance to the United
States.' 6 Indeed, the subordination of indigenous peoples in decisions such
152. Id.
153. 112 U.S. 94 (1886) (holding that if Native Americans born within the United States had not
been neutralized and had not become a citizen through any treaty or statute, these Native Americans
were not citizens within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Cleveland, supra note 150, at 57 (quoting Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)).
158. See Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongweghoweh and the Rise of the Native
Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon Indigenous
Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 107 (1999).
159. See DELORIA & WILKINS, supra note 138, at vii-xi.
160. Goodell, 20 Johns. at 712 ("Though born within our territorial limits, the Indians are
considered as born under the dominion of their tribes. They are not our subjects, born within the
purview of the law, because they are not born in obedience to us.").
582 [Vol. 20:557
THE CITIZENSHIP DIALECTIC
as Johnson v. M'Intosh16 1 facilitated the alternative models of subordinate
citizens. This in turn facilitated the Dred Scott decision and other subordina-
tion, such as that against people of color seeking to be naturalized and
inhabitants of this country's overseas colonial conquests.
Shortly after the United States government considered indigenous people
to be something other than citizens, the government entered into treaties with
tribes in order to maintain a relationship that would purportedly afford each
side a sense of sovereignty.162 Not long after the euphemism of sovereignty
was established and the tribal nations and the United States entered into
treaties, the United States government ceased to obey the treaties and simply
"told the indigenous peoples what they could and could not do, and where
they could do it.' 163 In large part because indigenous peoples were viewed as
part of their own sovereign tribes and were subject to tribal laws, the United
States took the position that the indigenous people could be dismissed as a
separate people, living in certain sections of America that could be controlled
without any recourse on their part.' 64
Eventually, the complete disregard for indigenous peoples gave way to
compromises which produced another form of subordinate citizenship. The
process of granting United States citizenship to indigenous peoples came in
steps and occurred over a considerable period of time. The first step was the
grant of citizenship to certain tribal nations as an "incentive" to remove these
people to the West. 165 Thus, some early treaties between the Indian Nations
and the United States provided for the attainment of citizenship. 166 Congress
then began to grant citizenship to certain tribes through legislation.167 Other
efforts were made via treaty with Mexico in the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, in which the Pueblo Indians were deemed United States citizens by
their failure to "choose" Mexican citizenship. 168 The Allotment Act granted
citizenship to indigenous peoples upon issuance of an allotment. 169 With the
passage of the 1924 Indian American Citizenship Act, the United States
government imposed a form of citizenship on all indigenous peoples and
161. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
162. Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and Indians, With Whom Does the United States Maintain a
Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1462 (1991).
163. Id. at 1480. "Thomas Jefferson's words to the Wea, Miami, and Potawatomi Indians serve as
an example: '[W]e shall with great pleasure see your people become disposed to cultivate the earth, to
raise herds or useful animals and to spin and weave, for their food and clothing .... We will with
pleasure furnish you with implements for the most necessary arts and with persons who many instruct
how to make and use them."' Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson's 1802 speech to the Miamis,
Potawatomis, and Weas).
164. Id. at 1480-81.
165. Porter, supra note 158, at 111.
166. Id. (citing Treaty with the Cherokee, July 8, 1817, art. 8, 7 Stat. 1256; Treaty with the
Cherokee, Feb. with Ottowa, June 24, 1862, art. 4, 12 Stat. 1237, 1238; Treaty with the Seneca,
Mixed Seneca, Shawnee, Quapaw, Etc., Feb 23, 1867, art. 13, 17, 28, 15 Stat. L. 513).
167. Id. at 112 (citing Act of March 3, 1843, S. Stat. 647 (naturalizing the Stockbridge Tribe)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 120.
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declared them to have concurrent citizenship with their respective tribes.1 70
By 1924, indigenous peoples could become United States citizens through
legislation, treaty, allotment, and a patent in fee simple by adopting the habits
of civilized life.
17 1
The subordinate nature of their citizenship was premised on notions of
inferiority. The group was characterized as existing in a state of "ignorance
and mental debasement." 172 The Supreme Court, in United States v. Ritchie, 
73
declared "[f]rom their degraded condition... and ignorance generally, the
privileges extended to them in the administration of the government must
have been limited; and they still, doubtless, required its fostering care and
protection."' 174 Subsequently, in 1909 the United States Supreme Court
confirmed their limited nature of citizenship. In United States v. Celestine,
the Court held that granting citizenship to Native Americans did not grant
them the "privileges and immunities" of United States citizens.1 75 In the
1913 case of United States v. Sandoval, the Court similarly concluded that
"citizenship [was] not in itself an obstacle to the exercise by Congress of its
power to enact laws for the benefit and protection of tribal Indians." 176 In
continuing to portray these people in a demeaning manner, Justice Van
Devanter observed that "as a superior and civilized nation," the United States
was obligated to protect "all dependent Indian communities within its
borders,"1 77 particularly appropriate in that case because Pueblo people were
an "ignorant" and "degraded" people.1 78 In 1916 the same Justice in United
States v. Nice concluded that "citizenship is not incompatible with tribal
existence or continued guardianship, and so may be conferred without
completely emancipating the Indians or placing them beyond the reach of
congressional regulations adopted for their protection."1 79 Professor Robert
Porter recently observed that "Indians today have the status of a minor-
acknowledged as citizens but not fully recognized as being able to care for
170. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 8 U.S.C § 1401 (2000); see also Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred
Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (2000).
171. Porter, supra note 158, at 123-24.
172. Goodell, 20 Johns. at 720.
173. United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. 525 (1854) (holding that the title of the land to the
purchaser in the purchaser's petition to the board of commissioners setting forth his claim to the land
against the government and others is confirmed).
174. Id. at 540.
175. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909) (holding that although Native Americans
were allotted land and made United States citizens pursuant to 24 Stat. 390, it did not cause the United
States to lose jurisdiction over the Native Americans for offenses committed within the limits of the
reservation).
176. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) (holding that although the Pueblo Indians
might arguably have been citizens, congress still had the authority to prohibit the sale of liquor in
their territory because they were Native Americans).
177. Id. at 46.
178. Id. at 45.
179. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916) (holding that Congress had the power to regulate
or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor to such Native Americans).
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one's own affairs.' ' 80 They are United States citizens simply because they
have been born on American soil, but they are regarded as being part of their
tribal communities and are afforded rights and immunities subject to their
tribal governments. 1 ' The application of the plenary powers doctrine consti-
tutionalized the inferior citizenship status of indigenous people and, as
Professor Saito observed in practical terms, resulted in Indian nations losing
ninety million acres of reservation land (more than two-thirds of their former
holdings). 182
B. The Territorial Island Inhabitants
The plenary powers doctrine is also the basis for the subordination of the
inhabitants of islands acquired after the Spanish-American War and World
War II.183 For this group, the United States Supreme Court used the plenary
powers doctrine to avoid extending constitutional protections to them. In the
period's major public policy debate, the Court concluded in the leading
Insular Case decision of Downes v. Bidwell18 4 that the Constitution did not
"follow the flag." "The power to acquire territory by treaty," Justice Brown
affirmed, "implied not only the power to govern such territory, but to
prescribe upon what terms the United States will receive its inhabitants, and
what their status shall be in what Chief Justice Marshall termed the 'Ameri-
can Empire."",18 5 In sum, the plenary power of Congress arose from the
inherent right to acquire territory, and the Territorial Clause (of the Constitu-
tion) endorsed the United States' treaty-making power and power to declare
and conduct war in other lands. "The Constitution applied to the territories
only to the degree that it was extended to them by Congress."1 86 As a result,
for this group there has never been any pretense concerning the Fourteenth
Amendment's applicability or equality for that matter. 87 These individuals
did not receive citizenship through the Fourteenth Amendment, the vehicle
used to grant or impose such status on virtually all other groups who have
attained it. These people became associated with the United States by
inhabiting lands conquered by the United States. When territory is acquired
in this manner, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that the
Territorial Clause in Article Four of the Constitution, and not the Fourteenth
Amendment, determines the rights of this group.' 88 As interpreted, this
180. Porter, supra note 158, at 135.
181. Id.
182. Saito, supra note 98, at 441.
183. Romdn, supra note 82, at 2-3.
184. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
185. Id. at 279.
186. Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular Cases,
(1901-1922), 65 Rev. JUR. U.P.R. 225, 246-47 (1996).
187. The label of Alien-Citizen can also theoretically apply equally to the other non-white
citizens addressed in the previous section.
188. Cf Downes, 182 U.S. at 251.
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provision endows Congress with complete or plenary power over these
people.1 89 In turn, the Court and Congress have kept this group in a
subordinate and disenfranchised status.
The island people who exist under the United States' control but are not
full members of the body politic reside in the island groups of Puerto Rico,
American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, the United States
Virgin Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and
the Republic of Palau.' 90 The island groups examined here fall into two
categories: the first are the unincorporated United States territories and the
second are the newly created sovereign, yet dependent, island groups of the
South Pacific. The so-called unincorporated territories include the islands of
Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, the United States Virgin
Islands, and American Samoa.1 9 1 These island groups are dependent lands
that the United States Supreme Court, in a series of decisions known as the
Insular Cases, concluded were neither "foreign" countries nor "part of the
United States."' 92 The unincorporated territories should undoubtedly be
classified as existing under a colonial regime because: the United States
Congress has plenary or complete power to govern the territories, including
the ability to nullify local laws and enact federal legislation dictating the
rights of the inhabitants of those territories; none of the territories are fully
incorporated as a state of the union or are sovereign nations; and although all
inhabitants born on the territories are United States citizens (nationals in the
case of Samoans), they do not enjoy similar rights as citizens on the mainland
and have no voting representation in the federal government. These last
colonial indicia ensure that the island inhabitants do not receive the same
amount of aide or other government largess provided to similarly situated
citizens on the mainland, nor do these people have the ability to vote for
President, Vice-President, or any member of Congress.
The second category of islands includes: The Federated States of Microne-
sia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. In
international circles, they are considered to be autonomous nation-states but
are included herein because of their similar history of annexation and the
existing issues concerning their sovereignty. These territories were formally
United States' dependencies and still are largely controlled by the United
States. In fact, the United States federal agency responsible for administering
the United States' territories, the Office of Insular Affairs, identifies the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated State of Micronesia, and the
Republic of Palau as being under the jurisdiction of the United States.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., EDIBERTO ROMkN, THE OTHER AMERICAN COLONIES: AN INTERNATIONAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES' NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURY
ISLAND CONQUESTS (Carolina Academic Press 2006).
191. Id.
192. Downes, 182 U.S. at 263.
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Despite the international perception of sovereignty stemming from labels
such as "Republics," or "Federated State," the Office of Insular Affairs
website notes that the United States maintains certain administrative respon-
sibilities and provides assistance. 193 In essence, the method of United States'
control over these three "sovereigns" mirrors the controlling efforts over the
unincorporated United States island territories. The unique history of Palau,
Micronesia, and the Marshall islands closely resembles the stories of the
unincorporated United States' territories of Puerto Rico, the Northern Mari-
ana Islands, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and American Samoa.
The United States began its overseas expansion during the period of the
Spanish-American War, which resulted in several Spanish territorial conces-
sions. In the Treaty of Paris, Spain officially ceded "to the United States the
island of Porto [sic] Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in
the West Indies."' 94 Consistent with the United States Constitution's grant of
Congress's plenary power under the Territorial Clause, Article Nine of the
treaty granted Congress the power over "the civil rights and political status"
of the territories and its people. 195 The Treaty of Paris endorsed the United
States' imperialistic venture as it was among the first times in American
history that "in a treaty acquiring territory for the United States, there was no
promise of American citizenship."1 96 In addition, the treaty did not promise
statehood to the acquired territories.1 97 As a result of the war, the United
States acquired Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines.19" The United States
Virgin Islands were later purchased from the Danish government in 1917.199
The inhabitants of Puerto Rico were granted citizenship in 1917. However,
unlike their brethren on the mainland, these Americans can neither partici-
pate in the national political process nor receive the full protection of the
Constitution. 200 Furthermore, they could arguably be stripped of their citizen-
ship status at any time. Similarly, the residents of the United States Virgin
Islands were granted U.S. citizenship in 1927201 and the inhabitants of the
Northern Mariana Islands attained citizenship in 1976.202 The residents of the
193. Office of Insular Affairs, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, History of the Office of Insular Affairs
(Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.doi.gov/oia/Firstpginfo/oiahistory.htm. The United States provides for
their defense, is responsible for government-to-government relations, provides grant funds and
Federal program assistance, and oversees and coordinates U.S. programs and funding assistance. Id.
194. See Treaty of Paris, United States-Spain, art. 2, Dec. 10, 1898, T.S. No. 343.
195. Id. at art. 9; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, §3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States.").
196. JULIUS W. PRArT, AMERICA'S COLONIAL EXPERIMENT 68 (1950).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See ROMAN, supra note 190.
200. See, e.g., RomAn, supra note 82 (observing that Puerto Rican born residents of Puerto Rico
retain an alien attribute despite being U.S. Citizens, as they cannot vote for President and
Vice-President and do not have representation in Congress).
201. 8 U.S.C. § 1406 (2006).
202. 48 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006).
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unincorporated territory of American Samoa have received even less, for as
nationals they have even fewer rights. Accordingly, the diluted form of
citizenship granted to these people under the auspices of Congress's power
under the Territorial Clause changed little in terms of rights but merely
facilitated a belief of belonging to the United States. The inhabitants were
granted a title that suggested power in the political process, but in actuality
they received little more than a label, coupled with a perception on their part
that they were attaining something of consequence.
For the residents of these island territories, their disenfranchised status has
not only caused inequality of political and civil rights, but has also mani-
fested itself through unequal economic treatment.20 3 For instance, as a result
of their subordinated status, residents of Puerto Rico receive less favorable
treatment than the mainland citizens under a number of major federal benefits
programs. For the residents of Puerto Rico, federal payments under Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, and food stamps are
made at lower levels and are subject to an overall cap.2° Similarly, the
Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) does not apply to Puerto
Rico.2 °5 Benefits under a similar program are capped and are made at lower
levels than SSI payments made to eligible persons residing in the States.20 6
Benefits for needy children are likewise provided at appreciably lower
levels.20 7
Relying on the territorial incorporation doctrine, the United States Su-
preme Court upheld this unequal economic treatment. The Justices have
concluded that as long as there is a rational basis for the discrimination, the
Court will uphold the acts. For instance, in Califano v. Torres,2°8 the Court
held that Congress can discriminate against the elderly, the blind, and the
disabled if they are inhabitants of Puerto Rico, even though they would
otherwise be eligible under the SSI program of the Social Security Act.209 In
Harris v. Rosario, the Court upheld as constitutional the reimbursement of
203. Puerto Rican citizens, with the exception of federal employees, are exempt from federal
income taxes on income earned in Puerto Rico. See I.R.C. § 933 (2006).
204. See Puerto Rico Status Referendum Act, S. REP. No. 101-481, at 10-11 (1990) ("Under
present law, federal social welfare programs under the Social Security Act such as AFDC, Medicaid,
Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled, Foster Care and Adoption Assistance, and Social Services block
grant operate differently in Puerto Rico than they do in the states. Under statehood, both the amount
of the welfare benefits and percentage of population receiving them would increase."); see also T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums and Prospects, 11 CONST.
COMMENT. 15, 15 (1994).
205. See Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 2 (1978) (holding that government benefits of a state
citizen do not transfer when that citizen moves to Puerto Rico).
206. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 303(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1494
(repealing Titles, I, X, and XIV of the Social Security Act with the exception that these titles would
still apply to Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1308(a)(1) (Supp.
1997) (specifying the amount of social security payments to Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands,
and American Samoa); see also 41 U.S.C. § 1396(b) (1994).
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b) (1994).
208. Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978).
209. See id. at 4-5.
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lower levels of AFDC to the people of Puerto Rico.210 Resting on Congress's
power under the Territorial Clause, the Court in these decisions summarily
found a rational basis for disparate treatment, thereby justifying Congress's
211discriminatory action.
Thus, United States citizenship status of the inhabitants of this country's
island conquests was and remains different from that held by their mainland
counterparts.21 2 Such membership, simply stated, flies in the face of basic
foundational constructs of United States citizenship law.
IV. SUBORDINATES IN FACT?
A. African-Americans
African-Americans, without question, fall into a category of individuals
who were subordinates in law. After exploring the de jure subordination of
African-Americans, this article will shift towards the question of whether
African-Americans are still subordinates despite attaining citizenship status
with the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution.
While African-Americans were finally granted United States citizenship
through constitutional amendment following the Civil War, over a hundred
years after that grant, questions persist as to whether they truly enjoy full
citizenship rights. African-Americans and other groups identified here,
though having attained official Fourteenth Amendment citizen status (a status
not attained by the territorial island people), have still repeatedly been treated
as something less than equals. In other words, although they may no longer
be subordinates in law, African-Americans and other racial minorities may
still be subordinates in fact.
Malcolm X poignantly expressed the depth of the frustration, estrange-
ment, and alienation of this citizen group:
The Black should be exempt from all taxation ... we want the federal
government to exempt our people from all taxation as long as we are
deprived of equal justice under the laws of the land.., why should you
be taxed if you don't get anything in return? How can you be charged
the same tax as the White man ... you have no business in a govern-
ment, as a second class citizen, paying first class taxes. The government
of the United States should exempt our people from all taxation as long
210. See Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651-52 (1980) (holding that Congress could treat
Puerto Rico differently from states so long as there was a rational basis for its actions).
211. See id.; see also Califano, 435 U.S. at 4-5.
212. Rivera Ramos, supra note 186, at 235 (reviewing the role of the United States Supreme
Court in justifying United States imperialism). Ironically, the United States, as the colonial sovereign,
exercises jurisdiction over the most basic aspects of life in the territory as it does in the states,
including communications, currency, labor relations, postal service, environment, foreign affairs, and
military defense. Id.
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as we're deprived of equal protection of the laws.., you don't have
second class citizenship anywhere on earth, you only have slaves and
people who are free.213
While the inferior status of African-Americans did not derive from the
plenary powers doctrine, it derives from the United States Constitution,
interpreted through similarly racist constructions. As originally drafted, the
Constitution excluded African-Americans in Article I, Section 2, which
counted African-Americans as three-fifths of a free person.214 In addition, the
first Supreme Court decision to address the political status of African-
Americans did not base its decision on the plenary powers doctrine; it did,
however, arise during the same period of that doctrine's creation, and similar
racist and nativist bases were used to subordinate indigenous people, recent
Asian immigrants, and inhabitants of United States island conquests. Thus,
while the case that sanctioned the disenfranchised African-Americans was
technically not a plenary powers decision, it is analogous in terms of its
white-supremacist foundation.
The very nature of how African-Americans arrived in this country strongly
suggests that those born here must be citizens, as they could owe no
allegiance to any other government than that of their place of birth.215 Thus,
the principles of equality and membership should have always applied to
African-Americans; of course, they have not.
The court-sanctioned exclusion of African-Americans is most vivid in the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford,216 where
the Court held that African-Americans, even those born in a free territory,
were not United States citizens.2 17 In that matter, the plaintiff Dred Scott was
born into slavery in Virginia sometime around 1800. Scott's master, an Army
doctor, eventually moved him to Minnesota, a jurisdiction that forbade
slavery. Scott sued for his freedom claiming that he was in a free territory and
therefore could not be a slave in that land. After engaging in an extensive
discussion surrounding the meaning of citizenship, Chief Justice Taney,
writing for the Court, concluded "we think the Negroes are.., not included
and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the
Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which
that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States."2t 8
213. Malcolm X, WISDOM OF MALCOLM X (Black Label, Inc. 1991) (Compact Disc Number
BLCD3-001).
214. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
215. Drimmer, supra note 54, at 691-94.
216. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
217. Id. at 404-05.
218. Id. at 404. Here, the Court's decision comports with a decades old opinion of United States
Attorney General William Wirt. Asked by President Monroe whether free Negroes in Virginia were
United States citizens, Wirt responded: "I am of the opinion that the Constitution, by the description
of 'citizens of the United States,' intended those only who enjoyed the full and equal privileges of
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The Court refused to recognize citizenship for this group because of their
perceived inferiority.219 Specifically, the Court referenced historical percep-
tions of African-Americans "as beings of an inferior order, and altogether
unfit to associate with the white race. '220 By so doing, the Court endorsed the
levels or gradations of membership established in the very first writings on
the concept, dating back to the ancient Greek writings of Aristotle. Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Taney declared:
The words "people of the United States" and "citizens".. . mean the
same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our
republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power
and conduct the Government through their representatives. They are
what we familiarly call the "sovereign people," and every citizen is one
of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The
question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea
in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent
members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are
not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word
"citizens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights
and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to
citizens of the United States.22'
In his concurring opinion, Justice Daniel observed:
The African... was regarded and owned in every State in the Union as
property merely, and as such was not and could not be a party or an
actor, much less a peer in any compact or form of government
established by the States or the United States... [S]o far as rights and
immunities appertaining to citizens have been defined and secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, the African race is not
and never was recognized either by the language or purposes of the
former. 222
Justice Daniel went further and specifically argued that freed blacks
possessed an intermediate membership level akin to that of a "freedman" and
not (as Scott argued) that of citizen. Accordingly, as a result of the propriety
of membership, Justice Daniel opined that African-Americans could not
white citizens in the State of their residence .... Then, free people of color in Virginia are not
citizens of the United States." I U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 507, quoted in ROCHE, supra note 39, at 18.
219. Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
220. Id. Accepting differing models of membership, the Court refused to recognize African-
Americans, even those born free, as citizens because "[i]t is not a power to raise to the rank of citizen
any one born in the United States, who, from birth or parentage, by the laws of the country, belongs to
an inferior and subordinate class." Id. at 417.
221. Scott, 60 U.S. at 404-05.
222. Id. at 481-482.
20061
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
possess citizenship's rights and privileges. The Justice made specific refer-
ences to the Roman law system of membership that included slaves,
freedmen, and citizens as a basis to support a similar class system within the
United States. He noted:
The institution of slavery, as it exists and has existed from the period of
its introduction into the United States, though more humane and
mitigated in character than was the same institution, either under the
republic or the empire of Rome, bears, both in its tenure and in the
simplicity incident to the mode of its exercise, a closer resemblance to
Roman slavery than it does to the condition of villanage, as it formally
existed in England. Connected with the latter, there were peculiarities,
from custom or positive regulation, which varied it materially from the
slavery of the Romans, or from slavery at any period within the United
States.
But with regard to slavery amongst the Romans, it is by no means
true that emancipation, either during the republic or the empire,
conferred, by the act itself, or implied, the status or the rights of
citizenship.223
Ultimately, the Scott Court adopted the Roman subordinate level of
participation model within 1800s American society. Irrespective of their title
of free person or slave, the African-American could not become a full
member of society.2 24 In other words, because of the Court's endorsement of
state-sanctioned racism and marginalization, non-whites, such as African-
Americans, were incapable of attaining equality in terms of full rights under
the Constitution.
223. Id. at 477-78. For discussion at length of the Roman construction of citizenship, which the
Court cited in Scott as indicative of the intent of the Founders and, hence, as fundamental to its
rationale (as quoted) and ultimate decision, see supra Part II. & note 74.
224. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1877 25-26 (Harper & Row 1988). Even Northern
states did not grant equality and full citizenship to the free black population prior to the Civil War. As
Foner synthesizes:
[T]he war... held out hope for an even more radical transformation in the condition of the
time despised black population of the free states. Numbering fewer than a quarter million in
1860, blacks comprised less than 2 percent of the North's population, yet they found
themselves subjected to discrimination in every aspect of their lives. Barred in most states
from the suffrage, schools, and public accommodations, confined by and large to menial
occupations, living in the poorest, unhealthiest quarters of cities like New York, Philadelphia,
and Cincinnati, reminded daily of the racial prejudice that seemed as pervasive in the free
states as in the slave, many Northern blacks had by the 1850s all but despaired of ever finding
a secure and equal place in American life. Indeed, the political conflict between free and slave
societies seemed to deepen racial anxieties within the North. The rise of political antislavery
in the 1840s and 1850s was accompanied by the emergence of white supremacy as a central
tenet of the Northern Democratic party, and by decisions by Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, and
Oregon to close their borders entirely to blacks, reflecting the fear that, if slavery weakened,
the North might face an influx of black migrants.
Id. (citing LEON F. LiTWACH, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860
(Chicago, 1961)).
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Eventually, after a long, bloody, and destructive civil war, the United
States Constitution was amended and purportedly granted "all persons" born
in the United States citizenship status. Nonetheless, as W.E.B. Dubois
questioned after the United States Civil War, serious doubts persisted as to
whether African-Americans were not only free but political persons.225
Dubois noted that the Fourteenth Amendment emancipates a multitude with
no political rights. Accordingly, while the perception of many may be that
emancipation would immediately evolve to enfranchisement, as Dubois
feared, that conclusion was far from the case.22 6 Despite theoretically
attaining citizenship and its related rights and anointments of belonging,
African-Americans were subsequently and repeatedly treated in an unequal
225. W.E.B DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: AN ESSAY TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE
PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA,
1860-1880, 289 (1963). Dubois observed:
It is clear that from the time of Washington and Jefferson down to the Civil War, when the
nation was asked if it was possible for free Negroes to become American citizens in the full
sense of the word, it answered by a stern and determined "No!" The persons who conceived of
the Negroes as free and remaining in the United States were a small minority before 186 1, and
confined to educated free Negroes and some of the Abolitionists .... Were we not loosing a
sort of gorilla into American freedom? Negroes were lazy, poor, and ignorant. Moreover their
ignorance was more than the ignorance of whites. It was a biological, fundamental and
ineradicable ignorance based on pronounced and eternal racial differences. The democracy
and freedom open and possible to white men of English stock, and even to Continental
Europeans, were unthinkable in the case of Africans.
Id. at 132. Carl Schurz, German immigrant, intellectual, and idealist, who traveled the South
extensively in preparing a report on the reconstruction efforts in the Gulf states for President Johnson,
found the situation little improved in the years after the war. DuBois quotes from Schurz's account at
length and also finds corroboration from reports from several states to the congressional Joint
Committee on Reconstruction. Among Schurz's observations:
The emancipation of the slaves is submitted to only in so far as chattel slavery in the old form
could not be kept up. But although the freedman is no longer considered the property of the
individual master, he is considered the slave of society, and all independent state legislation
will share the tendency to make him such. The ordinances abolishing slavery passed by the
conventions under the pressure of circumstances will not be looked upon as barring the
establishment of a new form of servitude ... Wherever I go-the street, the shop, the house,
the hotel, or the steamboat-I hear the people talk in such a way as to indicate that they are yet
unable to conceive of a Negro as possessing any rights at all. Men who are honorable in their
dealings with their white neighbors, will cheat a Negro without feeling a single twinge of their
honor. To kill a Negro, they do not deem murder; to debauch a Negro woman, they do not think
fornication; to take property away from a Negro, they do not consider robbery .... The whites
esteem the blacks their property by natural right, and however much they admit that the
individual relations of masters and slaves have been destroyed by the war and by the
President's emancipation proclamation, they still have an ingrained feeling that the blacks at
large belong to the whites at large.
Id. at 136.
226. Id. at 289-90. Reconstruction evoked great fear of political equality in the South, which had
already begun passing black codes in many of its states. Nor did the northern states present a unified
front in the protection of the rights of the newly-freed slaves. "In the fall elections of 1867 ... Ohio
rejected a Negro suffrage amendment... New Jersey refused to delete 'White' from its suffrage
requirements, and Maryland adopted a new law that gave the vote to whites only." JOHN HOPE
FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION: AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 74 (Univ. of Chic. Press 1961).
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227
manner, notwithstanding the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which was supposed to grant them full citizenship status. As a reconstruction
amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to specifically recog-
nize that African-Americans born in the United States were citizens. In the
Civil Rights Cases in 1883, the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of
1875, which prohibited "any person" from denying "any citizen" access to
privately owned places of public accommodations on the basis of race.228
Justice Bradley confirmed the lower citizenship status of African-Americans
prior to the abolition of slavery when he declared:
There were thousands of free colored people in this country before the
abolition of slavery, enjoying all the essential rights of life, liberty, and
property the same as white citizens; yet no one, at that time, thought it
was any invasion of their personal status as freemen because they were
not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or because
they were subjected to discrimination in the enjoyment of accommoda-
tions in inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement.229
Scholars have chronicled the pre- and post-Civil War disenfranchisement
of African-Americans. These chronicles trace the post-Civil War efforts by
white Southerners immediately to implement a de facto form of slavery
through efforts such as the "Black Codes"-designed, in particular, to ban
political participation and, more generally, to destroy any pretense of
equality.230 These oppressive efforts occurred with the full support of
President Andrew Johnson.231 The continued disparate treatment of these
people, which was often sanctioned by the Court, created the defacto inferior
citizenship status of this group. For instance, despite the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment, in Plessy v. Ferguson 2 3 2 Justice Brown, writing for
the majority, upheld a statute that required the segregation of white and
"colored" persons.233 Justice Brown based his discussion on a constructed
distinction between social and legal equality.2 34 He concluded that "[tlhe
227. See generally STETSON KENNEDY, JIM CROW GUIDE TO THE U.S.A.: THE LAWS, CUSTOMS AND
ETIQUETTE GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF NONWHITES AND OTHER MINORITIES AS SECOND CLASS
CITIZENS (Greenwood Press 1974).
228. United States v. Stanley (Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
229. Id. at 25.
230. Id. at 21-22; KENNEDY, supra note 227.
231. KENNEDY, supra note 227.
232. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551 (Court rejected petitioner's argument that the separation of the two
races stamped one race with a badge of inferiority).
233. Id. at 544. The Court reiterated that notwithstanding the Amendment's declarations that "all
persons born or naturalized" would be citizens, African-Americans were only citizens in name dejure
citizens, but not citizens in practice. The concepts of "equality of rights" and "equality of
opportunity" were inapplicable to them. Drimmer, supra note 54, at 396. Even after the constitutional
amendment that was enacted to acknowledge their freedom and equality, the Supreme Court
reiterated that they were not true citizens, but second-class citizens, or in Malcolm X's words,
perhaps still slaves.
234. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
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object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it
could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to
enforce social as distinguished from political equality.
235
The social versus legal distinction of Plessy replicated the tortured logic of
Dred Scott despite the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Plessy
Court reiterated that, notwithstanding the Amendment's declarations that "all
persons born or naturalized" would be citizens, African-Americans were not
recognized as true citizens: African-Americans were citizens in name, not in
law. The concepts of equality of rights and equality of opportunity were
inapplicable to them. Even after the Fourteenth Amendment's enactment,
which was specially passed to acknowledge the freedom and equality of
former slaves, the Supreme Court in Plessy reiterated that African-Americans
could be treated unequally. Indeed, they were something less, perhaps even
still slaves, to borrow Malcolm X's sentiments. These events highlight that
despite attaining a status that is supposed to connote equality, African-
Americans, at least during the era closely following the reconstruction
amendments of the Constitution, were not full and equal citizens.
Though Brown v. Board of Education236 specifically rejected the separate
but equal dichotomy of Plessy, even that decision failed to lift segregation's
stigma in public schools, as evidenced by the Brown II decision, its progeny,
and the social phenomenon of white-flight. To this day, African-Americans
must either face unequal treatment or be members of a group that repeatedly
faces a series of unfortunate events.237 These examples may come from a
variety of circumstances, including racial profiling by police such as "DWB,"
or "Driving While Black, ' 238 or the more subtle forms of subordination as
identified by Ellis Close in his book The Rage of a Privileged Class, where he
addresses how African-Americans, irrespective of their academic or financial
235. Id. at 544.
236. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning Plessy v. Ferguson and the
"separate but equal" doctrine, holding that the doctrine had no place in public education and that
segregation constituted a denial of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and holding that separate educational facilities were inherently unequal).
237. I am often reminded of this subordinated status when I recall when a dear friend, who
happens to be African-American and named Rodney King, oddly enough, wanted to leave my house
after a long debate about racial politics at around 2:00 a.m. I told him to stay because the bus station,
the New York/New Jersey Port Authority, wasn't very safe. He simply reminded me "Ed, remember
I'm black, everyone sees me as a criminal, so they are scared-I've got more problems with cops."
This saddened me, and still does because, you see, my friend, who happens to be the most honest and
honorable man I have ever met, could never take off the chains of stigma and subordination. It
reminds me that despite my pride and willingness to fight for racial justice, I can hide. Because of
racial constructions based on skin color, I can put on a suit or sweats and be the proverbial boy next
door. My best friend can rarely, if ever, do that, and I hope I never forget that fact.
238. For a detailed expos6 of the too often substantiated perception that blacks often face greater
scrutiny at the hands of police officers than whites, see David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics,
And The Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1999).
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achievements, are repeatedly reminded of their inequality in society.239
A recent manifestation of the African-American subordinate citizenship
debate concerns the voting representation of residents in the District of
Columbia. Of the over 550,000 D.C. residents, 60 percent are African-
American. 24 While members of this community pay federal and local taxes,
serve in the armed forces, and serve on juries to uphold federal law and
policies, these residents have no voting representation in Congress.2 4 1 It
wasn't until 1961, when the Twenty-Third Amendment of the Constitution
was ratified by the states, that the residents of the District of Columbia were
granted the right to vote in presidential elections.242 This event marked the
first time that United States citizens-who were not residing within the
political, governmental unit of a state-were granted the right to vote in
presidential elections.243
However, that right is effectively their only voice in the political process.
Voters in the District of Columbia elect a delegate to the House of Represen-
tatives who can vote in committee and draft legislation, but who does not
have full voting rights.2 4 Additionally, voters elect two "shadow" sena-
tors245 and one "shadow" representative 246 as non-voting representatives
who lobby Congress on District of Columbia issues and concerns. Denial of
Congressional representation to the predominantly African-American com-
munity in District of Columbia, to at least some scholars, "not only suggests a
belief in the unfitness of the population to participate equally in national life
but creates the kind of 'uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid'
239. ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 4-10 (Harper Perennial, 1993) ("You feel the
rage of people, [of] your group ... just being the dogs of society"). Note: on micro-aggression often
non-minority speakers and actors are oblivious to the repetitive, debasing innuendoes, even
unintended disrespectful comments that comprise micro-aggression. See Peggy C. Davis, Sympo-
sium: Popular Legal Culture, Law as Micro-aggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989). Prof. Ayres
explains micro-aggression as "one of those many sudden, stunning, or dispiriting transactions
that.., can be thought of as small acts of racism, consciously or unconsciously perpetrated, welling
up from the assumptions about racial matters most of us absorb from the cultural heritage in which we
come of age in the United States." Ian Ayres, Fair Driving, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991) quoted in
RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (N.Y. Univ. Press
2001).
240. U.S. Census Bureau, Data Set, Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000, in
CENSUS 2000 SUMMARY FILE 1 (SF 1) 100-PERCENT DATA, at DP-1 (Sept. 2002), available at
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?-bm= n&-ang=en&qr-name =DEC_2000_SF1_U-
DP1&ds -name=DEC_2000_SFl1 _U&geo_id=04000US 11.
241. Jasmin B. Raskin, Is This America? The District of Columbia and the Right To Vote, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 39, 40 (1999). See also Aaron E. Price, A Representative Democracy: An
Unfulfilled Ideal For Citizens of the District of Columbia, 7 U. D.C. L. REv. 77 (2003).
242. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
243. Amber L. Cottle, Silent Citizens: United States Territorial Residents and the Right To Vote
In Presidential Elections, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 325 (1995).
244. Currently, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton represents the District of Columbia in
this capacity.
245. As of this writing, Shadow Senator Paul Strauss and Shadow Senator Florence Pendleton
serve the District of Columbia.
246. As of this writing, Shadow Representative Ray Browne serves the District of Columbia.
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that the Supreme Court condemned and invalidated.... 247
More recent "unfortunate events" faced by African-Americans are evi-
denced by the treatment of this group during the 2000 presidential election.
In a racially charged national election that was decided by less than 700 votes
in the pivotal State of Florida, a state where the governor was the brother of
the election's eventual victor and where both brothers were strongly disliked
by a majority of African-American voters due to their positions on matters
such as civil rights, the United States Commission on Civil Rights investi-
gated widespread allegations of discrimination against African-Americans
on election day. The Commission's report found numerous irregularities on
Election Day and confirmed that perhaps thousands of African-Americans
may have been denied their right to vote.248 The report concluded: (1) the
most dramatic undercount in the Florida election was that of the uncast
ballots of countless eligible voters who were wrongfully turned away from
the polls; (2) statistical data, reinforced by credible anecdotal evidence,
pointed to the widespread denial of voting rights; and (3) the disenfranchise-
ment of Florida's voters fell most harshly on the shoulders of African-
American voters. The report concluded that the magnitude of the impact
could be seen from any of several perspectives:
9 Statewide, based upon county-level statistical estimates, black voters
were nearly ten times more likely than non-black voters to have their
ballots rejected.
* Estimates indicated that approximately 14.4 percent of Florida's
black voters cast ballots that were rejected. This compared with
approximately 1.6 percent of non-black Florida voters who did not
have their presidential votes counted.
* Statistical analysis showed that the disparity in ballot spoilage
rates-i.e., ballots cast but not counted-between black and non-
black voters was not the result of education or literacy differences.
* Approximately 11 percent of Florida voters were African-American;
however, African-Americans cast about 54 percent of the 187,000
spoiled ballots in Florida.249
The Commission made additional troubling findings concerning the elec-
tion. There was a high correlation between counties and precincts with a high
percentage of African-American voters and the percentages of spoiled
ballots. It concluded that nine of the ten counties with the highest percentage
of African-American voters had spoilage rates above the Florida average; of
247. Raskin, supra note 241, at 43-44.
248. U.S. Comm'n on C.R., Report, Executive Summary, REPORT ON VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN
FLORIDA DURING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (June 2001), available at http://www.usccr.gov/
pubs/vote2000/report/exesum.htm.
249. Id.
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the ten counties with the highest percentage of white voters, only two
counties had spoilage rates above the state average. Gadsden County, with
the highest rate of spoiled ballots, also had the highest percentage of
African-American voters. The data further showed that eighty-three of the
one hundred precincts with the highest numbers of spoiled ballots were
black-majority precincts.25 °
B. Mexican-Americans
Mexican-Americans are another group whose equal treatment under the
law is suspect. Their theoretical inclusion as subordinates arose during the
same period as the first use of the plenary powers doctrine and was similarly
based on racist and nativist perspectives. Hispanic urban centers in New
Mexico and Florida predated the pilgrim's landing at Plymouth Rock. Yet
Hispanics, according to most Americans, are our most recent arrivals-and
they have some basis for thinking that.251 Many Americans know that the
United States conquered land from the indigenous people consisting of
approximately "two million square miles of territory by conquest and by
purchase.252 What is not as well known is the fact that the United States
conquered Mexico in 1848 and took over half its then-existing territory. The
states of California, Nevada, and Utah, as well as portions of Colorado, New
Mexico, Arizona, and Wyoming were created from a 529,000 square mile
cession by the Republic of Mexico.253
The taking of the Mexican land was a result of the nation's westward
expansion, as journalist John O'Sullivan noted in 1845:
Away, away with all these cobweb tissues of rights of discovery,
exploration, settlement, contiguity, etc .... The American claim is by
the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole
of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of
the great experiment of liberty and federative self-government en-
trusted to us. It is a right such as that of the tree to the space of air and
earth suitable for the full expansion of its principle and destiny of
growth.2
54
Prompted by this spirit of "manifest destiny," the United States declared
250. Id.
251. Harry Pachon, Special Report: What Color is the Constitution? Crossing the Border of
Discrimination: Has the Civil Rights Movement Ignored Generations of Hispanics?, 15 HUM. RTS. Q.
32, 33 (1988).
252. Christine A. Klein, Treaties of Conquest: Property Rights, Indian Treaties, and the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, 26 N.M.L. REv. 201, 201 (1996).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 208 (citing RICHARD WHITE, IT'S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN, A HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN WEST 73 (1991)).
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war against Mexico to acquire additional territory.255 The result was the
signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which states in part:
The United States of America, and the United Mexican States, animated
by a sincere desire to put an end to the calamities of the war which
unhappily exists between the two Republics, and to establish upon a
solid basis relations of peace and friendship, which shall confer
reciprocal benefits upon the citizens of both, and assure the concord,
harmony and mutual confidence, wherein the two peoples should live,
as good neighbors ....256
Among other things, the treaty provided that the United States would respect
private property rights of Mexican citizens in the newly created portions of
the United States and those individuals would be granted United States
citizenship.257
However, as had occurred with the indigenous peoples, 258 the United
States never honored many of the treaty provisions.259 Despite the treaty's
pledge to "secure Mexicans their rights to property, by the turn of the century
almost all Mexican-owned land was lost during the land grant adjudication
process [and] ... challenges from squatters, settlers and land speculators also
promoted land alienation." Most fundamentally, "many Mexican citizens
(transformed by the Treaty into United States citizens of Mexican descent)
and their descendants never enjoyed full membership rights in this society,
despite the Treaty's promise that they would., 260 As Professor Richard
Delgado observed:
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ... purported to guarantee to Mexi-
cans caught on the U.S. side of the border full citizenship and civil
rights, as well as protection of their culture and language. The treaty,
modeled after ones drawn up between the U.S. and various Indian
tribes, was given similar treatment: The Mexicans' properties were
stolen, rights were denied, language and culture suppressed, opportuni-
ties for employment, education, and political representation were
thwarted.26 t
255. Id.
256. Guadalupe T. Luna, En El Nombre De Dios Todo-Poderoso: The Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and Narrativos Legales, 5 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 45 (1998) (citing to Treaty of Peace,
Friendship, Limits and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, United States-Mex., 9 Stat. 922 (Feb.
2, 1848)).
257. Klein, supra note 252, at 215.
258. Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?
And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice, By Derrick Bell, 97 YALE L.J. 923, 940
(1988).
259. Luna, supra note 256, at 71.
260. Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration, Citizenship, and U.S./Mexico Relations: The
Tale of Two Treaties, 5 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 121, 123 (1998).
261. Delgado, supra note 258, at 940.
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Mexican-Americans were disenfranchised in numerous other ways, includ-
ing immigration. The Constitution and the courts did little to interfere with
the racist immigration quotas, the Bracero system, and dragnet searches,
seizures, and deportations of anyone who looked Mexican. 62 In theory, the
Treaty, which ended the Mexican-American War of 1846 to 1848, promised
"grace and justice" by codifying the principal diplomatic objectives of each
party. For the United States, "grace" meant purchasing, for the bargain-
basement price of $15 million, thousands and thousands of acres of former
Mexican territories. For Mexico, "justice" meant protecting the civil and
property rights of Mexican citizens, including Native Americans, who
without moving had suddenly become new residents (and citizens) of a
foreign nation.263 As one writer observed:
In the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and in numerous Indian treaties, the
United States promised to respect property rights of the conquered. To
make such promises during the nation's idealistic youth or during its
feverish expansion across a seemingly-unlimited continent is one thing;
to keep them is quite another.26
Despite the grant of United States citizenship pursuant to the treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, more than a century later Mexican-Americans
were still not accepted as full members of the body politic. For instance, in
1954, the United States government initiated "Operation Wetback," the
campaign to deport undocumented Mexicans. 65 During this massive cam-
paign, a great many Mexican immigrants as well as United States citizens of
Mexican ancestry (and undoubtedly other Latinas and Latinos) were de-
ported. 266 The Mexican-American community was directly affected by this
campaign because it was "aimed at racial groups, which meant that the
burden of proving citizenship fell totally upon people of Mexican descent."
Those unable to present such proof were arrested and sent to Mexico.267
Moreover, when examining the disenfranchisement of Mexican-Ameri-
cans, one does not have to look further than the popular depictions of illegal
immigrants as Mexicans who have illegally crossed the border, despite the
fact that many illegal immigrants are individuals overstaying their visas.2 68 A
classic example of the current anti-Mexican-American fervor and the poten-
262. Id.
263. Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Mexican Americans in the United States on the Sesquicen-
tennial of the Guadalupe Hidalgo, 5 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 5, 6 (1998).
264. Klein, supra note 252, at 253; see also Guadalupe T. Luna, On the Complexities of Race:
The Theory of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 691 (1999).
265. JUAN RAMON GARCIA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN AMERICAN
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954 (Greenwood Press 1980); see also JULIAN SAMoRA, Los MOJADOS:
THE WETBACK STORY (1971).
266. See GARCIA, supra note 265, at 231.
267. Id.
268. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 955 (2d ed. 1997).
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tial consequences of such labeling was California's attempt to implement
Proposition 187, which would have denied aliens access to government-
funded social services including health care and education. 269 The campaign
to pass Proposition 187 played a consequential role in former California
Governor Pete Wilson's re-election campaign. 270 "Mr. Wilson spent millions
on television spots showing gritty images of Mexicans dashing across the
border, provoking the crudest stereotypes of dark-skinned hordes swarming
into California for welfare and crime."2 7' While some may suggest that
appropriate immigration limits are warranted, if Proposition 187 had been
implemented, further subordination and resulting stigmatization of Mexican-
Americans and other Latina-Latino immigrants would likely result with
profound negative effects.272
Similarly, if Proposition 187 had been implemented, authorities could
presume that those of Mexican ancestry and even other Latinas and Latinos
were illegal. This presumption could lead to the denial of benefits and related
deprivations for Latinas and Latinos unless they could prove citizenship.
Such negative consequences have resulted from provisions of United States
immigration laws that permit sanctions against those who employ undocu-
mented persons.2 73 In fact, the United States Commission on Civil Rights has
found "no doubt that the employer sanctions have caused many employers to
implement discriminatory hiring practices. 274
C. Other Non-Whites
Several legal scholars have addressed the outsider or foreign status of
other ethnic citizens in the United States. Several writings have turned to the
treatment of Asian-Americans to demonstrate their subordinate status notwith-
standing their attainment of citizenship. According to these works,275 Ameri-
can society has imposed a label of foreignness on several groups of American
citizens.276 The scholarship includes Latina and Latino citizens, Asian-
269. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187 (West); see also Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Member-
ship: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1996).
270. See Ron Unz, How the Republicans Lost California, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2000, at A18
(explaining that "California isn't too liberal for the GOP ... [but that] Republicans simply scared
away immigrant voters.").
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. 8 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (2006) ("It shall be the duty of every person... bringing an alien to, or
providing a means for an alien to come to, the United States ... to prevent the landing of such alien in
the United States at a port of entry other than as designated by the Attorney General or at any time or
place other than as designated by the immigration officers. Any such person, owner, master, officer, or
agent who fails to comply with the foregoing requirements shall be liable to a penalty to be imposed
by the Attorney General of $3,000 for each such violation .... ").
274. U.S. Comm'n on C.R., THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL AcT: ASSESSING THE
EVALUATION PROCESS iv (Sept. 1989).
275. See Romdin, supra note 82.
276. See Kevin R. Johnson, The End Of "Civil Rights" As We Know It?: Immigration and Civil
Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1486-1489 (2002). As Johnson observes:
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Americans, Arab-Americans, and other non-whites in the category of other
non-white/non-black subordinates.277 In addition to being characterized as
the "forgotten Americans" and the "invisible" members of society, they are
arguably endowed with the immutable characteristic of alien or foreigner.278
Noting that race relations in America are typically analyzed in the white-over-
black paradigm, Professor Gotanda has argued that this construct has the
effect of facilitating the failure to examine the unique racism faced by the
non-white non-black racial minorities. 279 In the white-over-black paradigm,
if a person is not white, then that person is socially regarded as something
other than American.28°
An example of the inferior status of other non-whites is the historical use
of the plenary powers doctrine to justify the deportation and exclusion of
undesirable Asian immigrants who otherwise were entitled to enter or stay in
the United States. In the Chinese Exclusion Cases, the United States Supreme
Court first extended the plenary powers doctrine to immigration. In Chae
Chan Ping v. United States,281 the plaintiff, a Chinese resident, obtained a
required certificate of reentry pursuant to an 1884 law established by
Congress and then left the United States to visit family in China. Prior to his
return, Congress passed a new law precluding reentry of all Chinese workers,
Over the course of its history, U.S. society consistently has viewed new waves of immigrants
as racially different outsiders. At different historical moments, German, Irish, Jewish, and
Italian immigrants all were deemed to be of different and inferior racial stock. Benjamin
Franklin, for example, decried the settling of German immigrants in Pennsylvania and
considered them to be of a different race than the English ....
... Lawful exclusion of certain groups of immigrants reinforced their status as racially
inferior, thereby contributing to the construction, and maintenance, of racial categories.
At first glance, the racialization of European national origin groups is wholly incongruous
with modern notions of race, particularly the almost reflexive treatment of all Europeans as
white. Classifying European immigrants as nonwhite becomes understandable only with the
realization that race is a social and legal creation. The social assimilation, or "whitening," of
various immigrant groups, such as the Irish and Jews which occurred slowly over time, reveals
how concepts of races are figments of our collective imagination, albeit with real-life consequences.
The racial classification of various immigrant groups reflects the fluidity of racial construc-
tions. Immigrants from Asia, the focus of the initial federal immigration laws, long have been
classified as racially different. Differences of physical appearance contribute to the resilience
of the racial classification of persons of Asian ancestry, which contrasts with the erosion of
such classifications for European immigrants. Immigrants from Mexico and Latin America
continue to be racialized in the United States .... Physical appearance, class, cultural,
linguistic, and religious differences contribute to this racialization.
Id. See also Kevin R. Johnson, Symposium: Citizenship and its Discontents: Centering the Immigrant
in the International Imagination Racial Hierarchy, Asian Americans and Latinos as "Foreigners,"
and Social Change: Is Law The Way To Go?, 76 OR. L. REV. 347 (1997).
277. Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrom ", in ASIAN AMERICANS
AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1087, 1088 (Hyung-Can Kim ed., 1992).
278. Professor Gotanda in his work concerning "the Miss Saigon Syndrome" addressed the label
of foreignness in what he termed as the "other non-whites dualism." Id. at 1095.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (holding that entry into the United States could
be denied to Chinese laborers because the legislature had authority under the sovereign powers delegated by the
Constitution to exclude foreigners and that any existing treaty with China did not strip them of their power).
THE CITIZENSHIP DIALECTIC
irrespective of whether they had a certificate of reentry. The Supreme Court
rejected the claim that the government had violated an international treaty as
well as the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Though acknowledging
a technical violation of the treaty with China, the Court decided to enforce
the Congressional action under the "last in time rule," whereby a court would
uphold a federal law that conflicts with a treaty even if it violates interna-
tional law. 282 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court iterated Congress'
power to regulate the rights of immigrants, which was deemed an inherent
power of the government to protect itself from foreign threats. In practice,
then as it is now, the foreign threat was typically categorized in racial
constructions as non-white. 83
The preceding section illustrated how two of the three classic means of
attaining citizenship-(1) Jus Soli, or acquisition of the status by birth by
being in this country, and (2) Jus Sanguinis, or being born of a United States
citizen-were not sufficient for the attainment of full or equal citizenship
status for a wide variety of people of color, including the indigenous people
of the United States and the inhabitants of the island conquests. Thus, the
pernicious and lesser-known side of the citizenship duality has perverted the
longstanding tradition of birthright citizenship.
V. THE RACIST NATURE OF NATURALIZATION
Unfortunately, the other means of attaining membership status under the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been applied in an
equally racist manner, as recently documented in the book White By Law, in
which Ian Haney-L6pez chronicled the history of United States naturaliza-
tion law.2 84 Pursuant to Article I of the United States Constitution, Congress
is empowered "to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. 285 Haney-
L6pez observed that "from the start, Congress exercised this power in a
manner that burdened naturalization laws with racial restrictions that tracked
those in law of birthright citizenship. 286
For instance, the first naturalization act, enacted in 1790, limited natural-
ization to "any alien, being a free white person who shall have resided within
the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for a term of two
years., 287 For over 162 years, race was a determining factor in whether one
could become naturalized. It was only after the Civil War in 1870 that
282. Id. at 600.
283. More recently, writers have even questioned the propriety of the disenfranchisement of
felons. See e.g., Afi S. Johnson-Parris, Felon Disenfranchisement: The Unconscionable Social
Contract Breached, 89 VA. L. REV. 109 (2003).
284. HANEY-L6PEZ, supra note 107.
285. U.S. CONST. art. I.
286. HANEY-L6PEZ, supra note 107, at 42.
287. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
2006]
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
African-Americans could be naturalized. 288 From 1870 until 1952, when
strict white versus black racial prerequisites were abolished, whites and
blacks could be naturalized, but other minority group members, particularly
Asians, could not. During the period of these racial prerequisites, applicants
from Hawaii, China, Japan, Burma, and the Philippines, as well as all
mixed-race applicants, failed in their naturalization arguments before courtS.
2 8 9
Courts, however, concluded that applicants from Mexico and Armenia were
"white," but vacillated over the whiteness of applicants from India, Syria,
and Arabia.290 Not only were these naturalization laws shameful examples of
this country's racist hostility to non-whites, but these hostilities were specifi-
cally expressed, ironically, through the concept of citizenship. Lopez co-
gently summarized the effect of such exclusionary efforts:
The prerequisite cases make clear that law does more than simply
codify race in the limited sense of merely giving legal definition to
pre-existing social categories. Instead, legislatures and courts have
served not only to fix the boundaries of race in the forms we recognize
today, but also to define the content of racial identities and to specify
their relative privilege or disadvantage in United States society .... The
operation of law does far more than merely legalize race; it defines as
well the spectrum of domination and subordination that constitutes race
relations.29'
That awful chapter in our nation's history, which legally validated segrega-
tion and racial subjugation, also propagated those same racist ideologies
through the concept of membership in the body politic. There is no more
powerful or efficient method of disassociating those unwanted ethnic and
racial groups from the more desirable majority than by excluding them from
membership into "Our Country." If Aristotle was correct and a nation is little
more than a composite "like any other whole, made up of many parts [where]
these [parts] are the citizens that compose it,"'292 then this tool of alienation
forces those unfit for membership to become parts of nothing-aliens in their
own land.
Having understood the mechanics of the duplicitous application of the
citizenship concept, the question begged is: What should the ideal form of
citizenship look like? While this is a simple question with an altogether very
complex and possibly controversial answer, a review of the citizenship
construct's current manifestation is in order before exploring an arguably
more aspirational vision of citizenship.
288. Id. at 43.
289. Id. at 2.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 10.
292. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book III.
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VI. THE CONTEMPORARY DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT
Contemporary domestic citizenship theory was significantly influenced
not only by the ancient and eighteenth century philosophers, but also by T. H.
Marshall's 1949 "Citizenship and Social Class. 29 3 Marshall divides citizen-
ship rights into three categories: civil rights, political rights, and social rights.
Virtually every academic discourse since Marshall's work has used his
rights-based paradigm. This is not to say, however, that the Marshall
framework is without its critics. Marshall's liberal framework has been
criticized by both the political left and right. The New Right school on
citizenship criticizes the framework for focusing on a passive model of
membership without any significant obligations attached to citizenship.294
While the notion of greater civic participation is appealing when one
considers, for example, the recent wave of tax breaks for the rich in this
country 295 and the disproportionate representation in the military by children
of the poor, working-poor, and people of color,29 6 the New Right's vision of
obligations appears selective. On the left, cultural pluralists advocate differ-
entiated citizenship or preferred citizenship rights for marginalized groups
because citizenship has been defined as rights for white men.297 The
pluralists argue that rights, including special rights and exemptions, should
depend upon group membership. While also sounding appealing, the plural-
ists' model, practically and politically speaking, is highly unlikely to be
achieved. More importantly, as this article demonstrates, there has always
293. Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 24, at 354.
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(describing how the rich are able to exploit the tax system).
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existed differentiated citizenship; it has just worked to marginalize the
politically weak. To borrow from Derek Bell's interest convergence theory,
without any incentive for the majority, the question that arises is how will
citizenship theory and practice make a 180 degree turnaround now to favor
the minority? Another group, the communitarians, calls for a greater empha-
sis and focus on civil or social associations, such as churches, charities, or
neighborhood associations, to promote more active citizenship and responsi-
bilities.298
While devotees of the communitarian, cultural pluralist, and new right
schools of citizenship have questioned or expanded upon Marshall's rights-
based focus, 299 virtually all groups address citizenship through Marshall's
rights-based framework. In fact, virtually all of the citizenship discourse for
the latter part of the last century implicitly or explicitly derived from
Marshall's theoretical model. According to Marshall's framework, society
requires a full-fledged welfare state to ensure that all citizens have access to
their full civil, political, and social rights.30 0 This contemporary domestic
construction of citizenship would seem to refer not only to delineated rights
but also to a broad concept of equal membership or incorporation into the
body politic.30 A correlative of this concept is a sense of belonging
and participation in the community that is the nation.30 2 This last component,
which contains both legal and conceptual aspects, demonstrates a psychologi-
cal component of the term. This construction suggests that the anointment of
citizenship is an important title that goes to the heart of the individual's
feeling of inclusion as well as the collective citizenry's sense of the value and
virtue of the democracy.
30 3
VII. A NEW CONSTRUCTION
The classical contemporary writer on the subject, T.H. Marshall, probably
had it right. He envisioned and elaborated on a model that has an egalitarian
and inclusive bent coupled with an affirmative obligation by the state to
achieve the goals of equal citizenship. The communitarian model for greater
civic participation through associations expands upon this model without
necessarily contracting it. The new right's vision reeks of the perceived
classic conservative effort to focus blame on the weak.
To step back for a moment, the classic ancient writers, such as Aristotle,
also extolled theories facially based on inclusion. In practice, Greek and
Roman leaders, as well as many others, included slavery and elitism within
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their social framework as a natural extension of citizenship. However, the
classical notion was at least honest in the sense that it never purported to be
something it was not, namely, a wholly inclusionary and egalitarian architec-
ture for socio-political function. The Greeks admitted with blunt sincerity the
inferiority of their subjects and slaves. Plato, author of that famous model for
republican government, wrote in his Laws, that "the soul of the slave is
utterly corrupt, and ... no man of sense ought to trust [him]." 3 4
Certainly, this is far from an ideal application of the egalitarian concept of
citizenship. It is, nevertheless, truthful about its citizenship architecture. This
is far from the case in the United States. On the one hand, we argue with the
laudable words of John Locke, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson, but on
the other hand, we ignore the subordinate legal status of the indigenous
peoples of our land and the inhabitants of our island colonies. We, in essence,
in almost an unnoticed fashion, declare that certain groups of persons cannot
be admitted or fully accepted. The solution is not merely to accept the
paradoxical result of citizenship theory's egalitarian nature vis-A-vis its
application, but, indeed, to apply the egalitarian concept in accordance with
the principles of nationhood that this country espouses.
While some may argue, as others have for over 2,500 years, that a nation's
greatness depends on the caliber of its citizens,3 °5 one should remember that
the survival of an idea does not necessarily make it any more correct or less
narrow-minded. Accordingly, T.H. Marshall's status- and rights-based para-
digm, which focuses on the state's obligation to ensure the full effectuation of
all political, civil, and social rights for all citizens, is a framework that should
be followed. Marshall's framework is the closest means to ensure that the
nation's greatness is achieved, not through constructions of superiority, but
through recognition of equality. Only by ensuring the guarantee of fundamen-
tal rights to all its citizens and the equal application of those rights to every
member can greatness be approached. Nonetheless, the first step towards
achieving that laudable goal is to acknowledge the wrongs of the past.
Specifically, this land has to admit that for too long it managed to use
constructions under the law to exclude disfavored groups of every sort during
its history. The unforgivable act, however, is that this exclusion has all too
often been advanced through a concept fundamentally believed to be egalitar-
ian in nature, which demeans the unwanted group more than would any other
form of alienation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The United States government's prosecution of similarly situated individu-
als that were accused of engaging in terrorist activities or engaging in war
304. PLATO, LAWS, Book VI.
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against the United States varies greatly. The most obvious difference in John
Walker Lindh, Yaser Esam Hamdi, and Jose Padilla is that, while they are
United States citizens, they are of different ethnic backgrounds. While we
cannot be certain of the basis for their disparate treatment, what we do know
are the following: (1) One accused was of Arab descent, one was Puerto
Rican, the other was Caucasian. (2) The government put the Caucasian
through our traditional legal system, where he had his day in court and
decided to plead guilty; the government never produced any evidence against
the Arab-descendant, but nevertheless gave him little option other than to
renounce his citizenship and agree to be deported or face the possibility of
indefinite confinement; and the Puerto Rican remains to this day confined
indefinitely as an enemy combatant. The disparate treatment of these individu-
als provides fodder for the critics of the neutrality of the law. The govern-
ment's action also raises questions concerning the raced nature of the
domestic war on terror, and will likely be part of the ongoing civil rights
versus national security debate following September 11 th.
This article uses the current debate regarding the appropriate levels of civil
rights held by those accused of terrorism to contextualize a broader debate
concerning the application of the citizenship construct and the rights associ-
ated with that construct. The bulk of the literature on both sides of the
post-September 1 th, civil rights-national security debate merely compares
the treatment of Arab-Americans and Muslim-Americans after September
l1th to the World War II era Japanese Internment Cases. While such
comparisons are appropriate, the disparate treatment of citizens dates consid-
erably further back than World War II. Differences or gradations of citizen-
ship are the little known component of the construct of citizenship. While the
term is almost universally recognized as including a notion of equality
among all those holding the title, the application, as well as a lesser known
aspect of the construct, also condones inequality among those who should or
do hold the status. While historically these differences between the members
of a society often manifested themselves in terms of differences in gender or
economic class, the differences or stratifications in the domestic arena have
more vividly demonstrated themselves when ethnic and racial minority
groups sought full and equal membership. Unfortunately, the United States
Supreme Court and Congress, throughout this country's history, have repeat-
edly refused to grant full membership to individuals from such groups. While
these denials have to some extent been ameliorated by constitutional amend-
ments, to this day certain groups, such as the indigenous people of this land
and the territorial island people, still hold a formal de jure inferior citizenship
status. Other groups, such as African-Americans, continue to challenge
whether the formal grant of citizenship, through vehicles such as the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, granted them full civil and
political participation.
The preceding pages have thus examined a little-addressed phenomenon
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concerning the history of citizenship. What emerges from this examination is
the fact that despite the repeated inclusive declarations dating back to the
term's genesis, not all who have possessed the status, or by definition of the
concept should have held the status, have had anything resembling the full
compliment of rights one would expect from the status. In the domestic
arena, despite a constitutional amendment that is premised on equality of
membership, that bestows citizenship on all born or naturalized in the United
States, and was specifically written to endow African-Americans with the
status of citizenship, a history of United States citizenship reveals that
disfavored groups rarely easily attained citizenship status. And when such
groups, particularly ethnic and racial minorities, attained the de jure status,
the United States repeatedly denied full membership or participation in the
American body politic. During this country's crucial juridical period explor-
ing the bounds and applicability of citizenship (from roughly 1822 to 1922),
the Supreme Court defined citizenship in such a manner to exclude each and
every major racial minority group within the United States from full or equal
citizenship. This phenomenon of differentiated levels of participation oc-
curred when, in addition to other disfavored groups, African-Americans, the
indigenous people of this land, and the inhabitants of the territorial islands
challenged their status as citizens.
Largely basing their decisions on racist and xenophobic notions, the Court
and Congress disenfranchised these groups. To this day, some within this
society, who by the definition of the citizenship construct should be full and
equal citizens, continue to exist in a formal or de jure inferior status. As
witnessed by the Civil Rights Commission Report on the 2000 Presidential
Election, groups such as African-Americans, despite a civil war, a constitu-
tional amendment, and an era of civil rights, may actually remain in a less
than equal status. A new vision of citizenship is needed: one where the
proclamations of equality are not just laudable declarations that merely
espouse an ideal attainable only for certain groups within a society. The
question that remains is: when will constitutional scholars, practitioners,
jurists, political leaders, activists, and the populous insist that the stratifica-
tions of citizenship come to an end?
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